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In 1994, South Africa’s post-apartheid government inherited a highly-centralised energy sector, 
in which all aspects including planning, procurement, generation, distribution, pricing, and 
management were determined through top-down institutional arrangements and investments, 
centred around Eskom. In 2016, however, following rounds of energy sector reform, and the 
successful implementation of the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producers 
Procurement Programme (REIPPPP), this centralised configuration of power showed signs of 
disruption. Municipalities began to ambitiously redefine their role by building on opportunities 
related to renewable energy, resulting in an emergent challenge to centralised energy policy 
and planning. This dissertation sought to explore how this contestation took shape and to 
explain how seemingly ad hoc actions have created new possibilities, as well as new regulatory 
frameworks, by municipalities for municipalities. To achieve this, an analysis of the evolution of 
decentralised renewable energy generation in South Africa between 2008, when it first began, 
and 2016, was undertaken, applying the method of process tracing to two case studies. In order 
to contextualise these bottom-up processes within the national political economy of energy, 
process tracing was also applied in a high-level analysis of countervailing movements that 
consolidate centralised energy planning and procurement during the same period, with a 
particular focus on national plans to undertake massive investments in nuclear energy. It was 
found that municipalities’ bottom-up actions have positioned them to drive renewable energy in 
such a way that seriously challenges the historical configuration of power that has determined 
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In 2008, a few South African municipal governments began to explore the idea of localised 
renewable energy generation. It was a response to growing concerns over the country's energy 
security, its carbon-intense energy generation, and to the potential of new technologies, like 
rooftop solar panels, to change the way people consume energy. They began to engage the 
National Energy Regulator South Africa (NERSA) on what these new technologies might mean for 
local energy distribution and sales. At this stage, the country's energy sector was highly 
centralised. It was steered by the Ministry of Energy and Department of Minerals and Energy 
(DME), and the publically owned monopoly, Eskom. Eskom owned and operated more than 90% 
of energy generation, all transmission, distributed more than 50% of electricity, and therefore 
controlled energy sources, pricing, and access (OECD, 2015a). National Cabinet also played an 
important oversight role.  
 
In this system, municipal governments played a critical and unusual role. They acted as local 
energy utilities, buying and reselling Eskom's electricity through local distribution grids. They used 
margins on these sales to cover infrastructure maintenance and other related expenses. Electricity 
fees and revenues were also a mechanism for cross-subsidising service delivery for low-income 
households. The result of these arrangements was that the viability of this centralised energy 
system directly impacted the financial sustainability of municipal governments.  
 
The model worked reasonably well, while municipalities were supplied with cheap electricity, but as 
the economy grew and energy access levels increased, ageing infrastructure showed signs of 
strain. By 2008, the country had experienced its first controlled local blackouts to manage this 
pressure, for which local answers were being sought, in addition to national responses. Both the 
supply and price of electricity on which municipal finances depended, suddenly became volatile. 
Rolling blackouts commenced, and prices began a steep increase that continued into 2016 (Lucy 
Baker, Burton, Godinho, & Trollip, 2015).  
 
The democratically elected ANC-led government of South Africa did not design the energy sector. 
It is a legacy system, inherited from the apartheid government: a coal-fired network of power 
plants, built to serve an elite minority; and a complex monopoly in a world that was seeing the 
benefits of more competitive sectors. Under apartheid, Eskom had also historically enjoyed a level 
of autonomy, shielded from external input by layers of secrecy (Public Affairs Research Institute, 
2013). A 1998 Energy White Paper introduced a national energy planning process, to facilitate the 






(Republic of South Africa Department of Minerals and Energy, 1998). It proposed some 
privatisation and competition in generation, unbundling Eskom's assets and creating a new and 
more efficient configuration of structures, restructuring local governments' distribution roles, and 
setting the country on a pathway towards decarbonisation. The ambitious, wholesale reform 
envisioned by this policy has never been fully realised, but countrywide energy planning, some 
privatisation, and renewable energy generation have been successfully introduced (Public Affairs 
Research Institute, 2013). Since 2011, the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producers 
Programme (REIPPPP) has facilitated investments in utility and small-scale wind, solar, hydro and 
waste to energy infrastructure, making a small but critical contribution the energy system 
(Eberhard, Leigland, & Kolker, 2014).  
 
By the end of 2016, the centralised institutional relationships that governed the sector, and 
determined South Africa's energy future, were still intact. Eskom continued to dominate electricity 
generation, with further significant additions to its infrastructure network made in the intervening 
years. The public utility also still controlled the national transmission grid and a proportion of 
distribution and sales. Municipalities too had withstood attempts at curtailing their role in the sector, 
retaining their local distribution function. For some local governments, electricity sales generated 
more than a third of revenues, with total municipal revenue from electricity sales at 28,8% for the 
quarter ending in June 2016 (StatsSA, 2016).  
 
Throughout 2016, it was made evident that the plan to ensure the viability of the South African 
energy sector was hugely contested. The latest energy outlook, the Integrated Resource Plan 
(IRP) 2010-2030, updated in 2013, seemed to be moving towards greater decentralisation, 
incorporating small-scale renewable energy in the energy mix, in addition to REIPPPP's larger 
investments (Republic of South Africa Department of Energy, 2013).  
 
Internationally, the rise and improvement of renewable energy technology, because these 
technologies are technically and financially feasible at many scales, has fuelled discourse on the 
decentralisation and localisation of energy systems (Riahi, 2015; World Energy Council, 2016a). In 
countries, such as Germany and Denmark, the United States, and Kenya, the benefits of localised 
renewable energy investments are being demonstrated and widely celebrated. The implementation 
of these technologies has brought the role of municipal governments to the fore, as citizens, 
renewable energy investors, and local governments have pushed for more locally responsive, 







In South Africa too, a growing body of investments, local policies and regulations are tentatively 
redefining the role of municipalities, from the ground, up (AMEU, SALGA, & GIZ, 2016; 
Government Technical Advisory Centre, 2015). The first tentative steps to accommodate 
decentralised renewable energy generation could be described as ambivalent at best; however, 
this in no longer the case for many ambitious local governments such as the City of Cape Town or 
Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality. Risks to, and opportunities for, municipal financial security, the 
sustainability of local service delivery, and local economic development (LED) are motivating a 
new attitude and approach to the energy sector. 
 
At the same time as this bottom-up experimentation has been developing, a top-down, large-scale 
nuclear procurement programme has been driven by the Ministry of Energy, the Department of 
Energy (DoE) that has replaced the DME, Cabinet, and Eskom. This investment in 9,600 MW of 
nuclear capacity sets South Africa on a distinct trajectory. Currently, it is in tension with both 
municipal efforts, and the widely celebrated REIPPPP. The contestation between two very different 
energy futures – one centralised and driven by nuclear, the other more decentralised built on 
renewables – is the context for questions explored in this research. The first of these questions is, 
how can decentralisation be understood in the context of South Africa's energy sector? 
Furthermore, why and how are municipalities pursuing this agenda? And finally, who has the 
power to determine South Africa's energy sector? While this research cannot offer a final answer to 
any of these issues, it draws attention to local governments, an often-marginalised level of activity, 
needs, risks, opportunities, incentives and decision making in this arena. 
1.1 Methodology 
In the 2013 IRP update, small-scale renewables, especially solar PV, was identified as a “path of 
least regret” for national energy investments, in the context of economic and other uncertainty. In 
the three intervening years between the two IRP processes, the projected annual domestic energy 
demand decreased dramatically from 454,000GWh1) to a more uncertain range from 345,000GWh 
                                                 
 
 
1 GWh and Megawatt hour (MWh) are measures of energy used over a unit of time. In order to get to a certain amount of 
GWh for the year, a certain amount of installed capacity is required to generate that energy. Because this installed 
capacity does not operate at 100% efficiency, a measure must be applied to capture how efficient it is. This is required to 
ensure sufficient installed capacity to meet a target, as set out, for example in the IRP. If a 12MW wind farm produces an 
average of 6MW, then the capacity factor = 6 / 12 = 0.5 or 50%. Different technologies in different contexts can have 
vastly different capacity factors. The GWh or MWh generated in a year is equal to total installed capacity, multiplied by 
the capacity factor which is a measure of the efficiency of the technology being used, multiplied by the number of hours 
in a year. 1MW of solar capacity with a capacity factor of 25% will produce 1 x 0.25 X 8760 = 2190 MWh of electricity in 







to 416,000GWh (Republic of South Africa Department of Energy, 2013). What this meant was that 
the total required peak generation capacity dropped from 67,800MW to 61,200MW (-6,600MW). 
Fewer infrastructural investments would be needed than planned in 2010, and the IRP 2013 
specifically proposed a myriad of small solar investments as a preferable alternative to any new 
large-scale nuclear.  
 
In 2016, both small-scale renewable together with a menu of localised energy arrangement, and 
nuclear capacity are being pursued concurrently, by different actors. It is unclear which strategy 
will succeed, shaping the energy sector for decades to come. Without a clear national policy on 
decentralised renewable energy, and with no regulatory clarity, various municipalities have made 
significant steps towards enabled localised renewable energy investments. Given the ongoing 
work by municipalities in an unclear regulatory context, the hypothesis tested in this research is: 
 
H1: Municipal policy, regulations, investments and facilitation are creating a bottom-up alternative 
to South Africa's highly centralised energy sector, in which energy planning, procurement, 
generation, transmission, and a proportion of the distribution, are all determined through 
centralised institutional configurations. 
 
This hypothesis is about whether or not the transforming role of municipalities in the energy sector 
is increasing their power to influence how the South African energy system functions, and to what 
extent this is disrupting centralised control over the direction in which the energy sector is evolving.  
 
To test this hypothesis a ‘process tracing' approach was taken, to analyse the events from the 
municipal perspective, between 2008 and 2016. Process tracing was selected because it allows for 
the construction of a cogent explanation of a change or noteworthy outcome, like, for example, the 
state of play in the energy sector in 2016, by linking descriptions of key events over time in a 
causal narrative (D. Beach, 2012). It was applied by mapping out relevant information during this 
period, selecting key events, and situating them in an explanatory sequence. Process tracing 
involves a close examination of events under consideration to develop a fine-grain understanding 
and description of events.  
 
In this research, a process tracing approach is first applied at a municipal level, tracing the 
evolution of bottom-up policy and practice around decentralised renewables, focusing in on two 
municipal case studies. The empirical research was carried out in the Western Cape Province. 






energy are also based in Cape Town. Among these is GreenCape, affiliated to the provincial 
administration. The forms of data collection included: 
• Document analyses using publically available, as well as internal strategic communications 
from various government administrations 
• Semi-structured interviews  
• Telephone and email exchanges with different organisations, including representatives of 
national, provincial and local government, NGOs and energy consultants 
This bottom-up story is, however, in incomplete. Without fully contextualising the narrative, it was 
possible to overstate the extent and sustainability of municipal activities, as well as any 
consequent gains in authority or transformations of their mandate on energy. 
 
Given the tenacity of the nuclear procurement process, proceeding without a clear policy or a fully 
articulated economic justification, it was necessary to consider that the opposite of this hypothesis 
could be more accurate. As this research evolved, it seemed increasingly feasible, that: 
 
H2: The development of a top-down nuclear procurement programme is crowding out any space 
for the development of decentralised renewable energy. 
 
This secondary hypothesis was considered in conjunction with the first, as a supplement. Process 
tracing was applied again, to develop an understanding of the role and influence of major 
stakeholders and events over expanding and contracting municipal agency. Again, this 
methodology was useful because of its emphasis on historical context and the identification of path 
dependency created by contingent events (Derek Beach, Pedersen, & Collier, 2011). This second 
application was undertaken to link historical bottom-up (municipal) and top-down (national) actions 
from 2008 onwards, to the configuration of actors and strategies shaping the energy system in 
2016. Information was drawn from policy documentation, academic literature, as well as news 
reports. This part of the narrative, while pointing to the relevance of certain key individuals, is 
limited in depth, because no in-person interviews were carried out. Consequently, a certain level of 
description, of interpersonal dynamics shielded from public view, were not accessible. It is, 
however, much better documented than municipal work. 
1.2 A Decentralised Energy Future for South Africa?  
The contest in South Africa can be understood at a very high level as a contest between a 
centralised and decentralised future for the energy sector. To get to the analysis described above, 
Chapter 2 develops a simple framework through which to view energy sectors in terms of: a) 






whether there is any diversity of public and private ownership; and b) whether or not policy, 
planning, procurement, transmission, and distribution functions are centralised or decentralised. 
This framework is illustrated in Figure 1 in Chapter 2. 
 
With reference to this framework, this chapter provides a brief overview of international movements 
towards greater decentralisation, building on the characteristics and opportunities provided by 
renewable energy technologies. I review relevant literature generated by leading influential energy 
policy organisations, selected national governments, and various other analysists, to surface the 
patterns, risks and opportunities associated with this trend. Chapter 2 sets the stage for an 
analysis of the South African energy sector. Chapter 3 applies the framework developed in 
Chapter 2, to the analysis of the transforming role of municipal governments, pulling the sector in 
the direction of a more decentralised configuration of actors and power. Working with the same 
scheme, Chapter 4 contextualises this bottom-up narrative within the national political economy of 
energy, top-down strategies for energy sector reform, and various energy procurement initiatives, 
focusing on nuclear procurement. 
 
In this work, particular stakeholders emerge as key role players, broadly coalescing around three 
movements shaping South Africa's energy landscape emerged, promulgated by different 
stakeholders. These movements are: 
• The drive for renewable energy generation, planned, procured and managed from a 
national level through the REIPPPP office; 
• The drive for decentralised renewable energy generation (not necessarily opposed to 
REIPPPP), planned, procured and managed from a local government level; and 
• The drive for nuclear energy, planned, procured and managed from a national level through 
Eskom.  
Taken to their logical conclusions, these three movements imply very different configurations of 
power within South Africa's energy landscape. Chapter 4 provides an overview relevant 
stakeholders and key actions in support of these various strategies for a low-carbon, energy-
secure future for South Africa. These movements for and against centralised and decentralised 
determination of the country's energy future are drawn together in Chapter 5, which provides a 







2 The Case for Distributed Electricity Generation, Driven by 
Local Governments 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter lays out the general case for decentralised renewable energy generation, with a 
particular motivation for an active municipal government role in driving and managing localised 
grids that support this. The case for a transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy generation is 
well made. Most major international energy and sustainable development policy organisations are 
advocating for this change. Among these advocates are: The World Energy Council, the 
International Energy Agency, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), various agencies within the United Nations (UN), the World Economic Forum (WEF), as 
well as the USA National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), ODI, GIZ, ICLEI, WWF, 
Bloomberg New Energy, and various other NGOs, think tanks and consultancies. For this reason, 
the broader case for renewables is only given very limited attention here. The more pertinent 
argument considered is for the implementation of renewable energy that is decentralised, both in 
the sense of being governed at more local levels, as well as being owned and operated by public 
and private investors other than a national public utility.  
 
This chapter begins by constructing a basic conceptual scheme for understanding centralised 
versus decentralised energy sectors, considering both the above-mentioned dimensions of 
"decentralisation". Within this scheme, decentralised renewable energy is energy generated from a 
variety of renewable sources, at various scales from small to utility, with diverse ownership, and 
accompanied with some degree of localisation of policy development, planning, governance and 
procurement. Within this project, the case for decentralised energy systems will be made with 
reference to international trends towards greater decentralisation, incorporating views from recent 
research on the successes, potential and risks associated with these systems. Particular reference 
is made to the German case study, a well-established example of multi-level policy support and 
implementation of decentralised renewable energy generation. 
 
The second part of this chapter argues that decentralised renewable energy implies a greater 
involvement of actors and decision-makers closer to local contexts. In particular, I claim that there 
is an important and beneficial role to be played by local governments. The benefits of 






infrastructure and the grid that supports it. There is a clear argument, introduced here, for 
municipal governments to wholly fulfil or at least to support this function, and to coordinate efforts 
with each other as well as national actors.  
2.2 The Case for Renewable Energy as an Alternative to Fossil Fuels 
Globally, the case for a shift towards renewable energy sources, with greater levels of 
decentralisation of generation infrastructure investments and ownership, has been steadily gaining 
traction over the last two decades. This nascent shift in understanding of energy policy ‘good 
practice' was reflected in the South African government's 1998 White Paper on Energy. It can be 
seen in features, such as the introduction of privatisation, competition, and a diversity of energy 
sources into a system that was dominated by Eskom, fuelled mainly by its network of large coal-
fired power stations. Carries by the increasing momentum of decades of investment and innovation 
in alternative energy, the current wave of shifts in energy sectors underway in countries around the 
world can be usefully characterised as an ‘energy transition'. It is an enduring, broad, structural 
reform in an energy system, referring to all aspects of that system, including energy sources, use, 
distribution, and ownership (Hauff, Bode, Neumann, & Haslauer, 2014). The most obvious reason 
for these transitions is to ensure a secure energy supply into the foreseeable future. While the real 
motivations, goals, drivers and governance regimes in particular countries are diverse, emphases 
on low carbon, resource-efficient energy, as well as greater decentralisation, are now fairly 
standard (Sovacool, 2016).  
 
The transition towards a larger share of renewable energy generation is happening, in part, 
because the imperative to respond to the threat of climate variability has become urgent 
(International Energy Agency, 2016; OECD, 2015b; Riahi, 2015; UNEP, 2015; United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa, 2016). The switch from fossil fuels to renewable energy is seen 
as one of the most efficient mechanisms to achieve global greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction 
targets and mitigate against dangerous climate change  (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2016; 
UNEP, 2015; World Energy Council, 2016b). This international commitment to dramatic GHG 
emissions reductions is articulated in the Paris Agreement, ratified by 116 countries (United 
Nations/Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2015). The Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs), signed by 150 world leaders, is similarly oriented. Goal 7 aims to, "Ensure access to 
affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all", incorporating a commitment to drive 
the uptake of renewable energy, clean energy technology, and "sustainable" energy sources 
(United Nations, n.d.). Renewable energy is not without any environmental impacts, but continuous 






ecosystem health, and land use into account, wind, solar and hydropower are still far more 
sustainable than any fossil fuel based generation (UNEP, 2015). 
 
Not only is renewable energy the best way to reduce the climate-related impacts of energy 
systems, but it is also increasingly cost competitive with other forms of generation, already 
undercutting coal in some instances (Hirtenstein, 2016). A recent report by Bloomberg New Energy 
has forecast that up to 2040, US$11.4 trillion will be invested in energy, globally, of which US$7.8 
trillion will be invested in renewables (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2016). This trend primarily 
attributed to the decreasing cost of wind and solar generation, in particular. Procurement and 
governance arrangements shaping global renewable markets, with competitive bidding or auctions 
contributing to falling prices. While 'greening' energy has historically been juxtaposed with 
economic growth, this is no longer the case. Increasingly, renewable energy is seen as a way of 
‘decoupling' economic growth from fossil fuel consumption, at the same time as energy efficiency 
technology is decoupling economic growth from increases in energy consumption (Obama, 2017). 
 
One of the main challenges of renewable energy remains the issue of intermittency (Lucy; Baker, 
Newell, & Phillips, 2014; Kemfert, Opitz, Traber, & Handrich, 2015; McLellan et al., 2015; UNEP, 
2015; World Economic Forum, 2015; World Energy Council, 2016b). While waste to energy 
technology is an exception, wind and solar power are not consistent, because they only generate 
electricity while the wind is blowing or the sun is shining. This can be solved with storage, for which 
the technology is evolving and is also still expensive; or with a supplementary buffering electricity 
generation such as natural gas (McLellan et al., 2015). 'Extra' energy can be used, as needed, to 
ensure a constant base level of generation (base load) or for additional power during peak demand 
times (peak load) only. Investments in base load or peaking power push up the real cost of 
renewables. However, recent comparative assessments of the cost of new energy capacity in 
South Africa places the cost of renewables below coal (and well below nuclear), even if combined 
with natural gas (CSIR, 2016). Furthermore, given the rapid development of technology in the 
renewable sector is set to improve the quality and decrease the cost of storage, as forecast in 
Bloomberg’s New Energy Outlook 2016, which foresees significant gains already by 2020 
(Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2016). What this suggests is that energy policy should account 
for technological advances by avoiding locking into long-term infrastructure that will either crowd 
out better alternatives in the future or be left stranded as businesses and residential consumers opt 







The rise of renewable energy is having far-reaching and transformative consequences for the 
structure of energy sectors. Transitioning to a greater share of renewable energy can increase 
decentralisation, or ‘distributed' generation. In South Africa, the Renewable Energy Independent 
Power Producer's Programme (REIPPPP) has introduced a small share of privately owned, 
competitively selected energy production. However, the entire selection process, overall planning 
and management, transmission, as well as purchasing transactions are still highly centralised 
under the control of the National Department of Energy (DoE) and the state-owned utility, Eskom 
(Fourie, Niekerk, Nel, & Department of Energy IPP Office, 2015). REIPPPP has not disrupted the 
structure of the country's energy sector. Where control of renewables has not been so tightly 
regulated, the proliferation of renewable energy infrastructure, from utility scale down to small-
scale, to has fundamentally altered the structure of energy sectors. 
 
The transformative potential of renewable energy technologies, including solar PV, wind, hydro 
and waste to energy, is a product of their technical and financial feasibility at a variety of scales. 
This size of a renewable installation can range from a single residential rooftop solar panel to a 
neighbourhood block, a whole community, commercial business parks, and up to a utility scale 
plant (Mendelsohn, Lowder, & Canavan, 2012). Small-scale installations are systems falling below 
5MW generation capacity, but they typically fall well below 1MW2e scale variability has allowed 
households, communities, local governments and businesses of various sizes to invest directly in 
energy generation capacity, in addition to more traditional investments by public or private utilities 
owning and operating all large-scale infrastructure. The motivation for the uptake of these small 
systems is simple: there is an increasingly strong investment case for businesses and households, 
and even local governments. Investing in private generation is becoming cheaper than buying 
electricity from a large public or private utility (Obama, 2017). For households, businesses and 
local governments that are investing in small-scale renewable energy, the environmental 
motivation is also becoming stronger as risks associated with climate change becomes more real 
than hypothetical (Bauwens, 2016; CDP, National Business Initiative, & Incite Sustainability, 2013).  
 
Renewable energy can also be used to achieve broader sustainable developmental outcomes. 
Renewable energy can support more equitable energy access, and ensure optimal natural 
resource consumption and stewardship (Brooklyn Microgrid, 2016; Ulsrud, Winther, Palit, & 
                                                 
 
 
2 According to the Solar Energy Industry Association (SEIA) of America, the current national average for the number of 
households powered by 1MW of installed solar PV is 164 (Solar Energy Industry Association (SEIA), 2015). This figure 






Rohracher, 2015; Ververis, Schecht, & Donahoe, 2015). These benefits result from both the cost 
competitiveness and also the down-scalability and adaptability of small-scale renewable systems. 
The use of smaller solar PV systems, a collection of connected PV panels termed a ‘microgrid', 
can be implemented in well-developed urban areas, but has a particular value in countries or 
regions with significant energy infrastructure deficits. The suitability of microgrids to these contexts 
stems from their functionality, with or without access to a centralised distribution grid. In developing 
countries such as Kenya, Nigeria, Liberia and Ghana, this small-scale renewable energy 
infrastructure is being used as an opportunity to respond to energy poverty. Microgrids meet 
energy needs in the absence of adequate conventional utility scale generation and grid access 
(Mohammed, Mustafa, Bashir, & Mokhtar, 2013; ODI, GOGLA, Action, & SolarAid, 2015; Ulsrud et 
al., 2015). In this way, renewable energy is a potential mechanism to leapfrog beyond the older 
fossil fuel or nuclear-dependent infrastructure trajectories of many developed nations, directly to 
cleaner, and progressively cheaper energy sources (United Nations Economic Commission for 
Africa, 2016).  
 
2.3 The Case for Decentralised Renewable Energy Generation 
Eskom is but one of the electricity utilities around the globe facing enormous 
pressure. New technologies, energy efficiency and a move away from centralised 
and dirty coal-based generation is” causing what some (but certainly not all) 
predict will be a “Utility Death Spiral” - (de Vos, 2016) 
A useful way of thinking about energy systems for this analysis is in terms of the relative 
centralisation of energy generation on the one hand, and energy planning, transmission, 
distribution and procurement on the other. An energy system that falls into Quadrant A, below, 
would be a system in which there is a monopoly in charge of generation, governed by highly 
centralised energy policy-making and regulation at a national level. Quadrant B would include 
systems in which there are many energy generators, but the planning, management, procurement, 
and transmission and distribution of this energy is all centrally controlled by a national government 
department or regulating agency, or both. The reality is that energy systems can fall along a 








Figure 1: Conceptual Framework for the Structure of Energy Systems 
Similarly, energy sectors with some degree of competitive can fall along a continuum of centralised 
planning, procurement, management and from quadrant B to C. Quadrant C includes decentralised 
energy systems in which there are many different sources of power generation at various scales 
that feed into local distribution grids. It is widely understood that the uptake of renewable energy 
implies some movement along from A to B, and from B to C, towards greater decentralisation 
(McLellan et al., 2015).  
 
In Quadrant C, the most extensively decentralised systems are modular, consisting of households, 
neighbourhoods, businesses (agricultural, industrial and commercial) and local governments 
generating energy for their own consumption and feeding surplus energy back into the shared grid. 
These systems include companies producing energy for sale. This kind of dynamic system of 
distributed energy demand and supply has been called "transactive energy", consisting of many 
diverse consumers, producers, and "prosumers" that both consume and produce energy (World 
Energy Council, 2016a). While some of these transactions may be peer-to-peer, this myriad of 
small to large intermittent energy sources still requires a shared grid to facilitate energy trading and 
to ensure uninterrupted energy supply, as well as to ensure that electricity goes from where it is 
supplied to where it is demanded. This ‘smart' grid would allow for accurate metering, monitoring of 
energy security, dynamic distribution, and tariffs (Sharifi & Yamagata, 2016). As a result, a utility of 






complex energy ‘service' role than simply selling a good to a captive market. This utility could 
feasibly take many forms. It could be a private company, a municipal agency, or some other kind of 
organisation, such as a cooperative (Becker, Blanchet, & Kunze, 2016; Hoppe, Graf, Warbroek, 
Lammers, & Lepping, 2015; ICLEI, 2015; Julian, 2014; Riahi, 2015).  
 
The case for greater decentralisation is twofold. On the one hand, from a government or public 
interest perspective, there are significant technical and socio-economic benefits to decentralised 
energy generation; on the other, there is a financial case for private investment for both 
households and businesses driving private investment for those that can afford it. Organisations 
such as the EIA, UNEP, other UN agencies, WEF, the World Energy Council, and the OECD have 
moved well beyond whether decentralised renewable energy as such is a good idea. Instead they 
examining the extent to which energy could/should be decentralised, how best to achieve an 
optimal set of local and national policy arrangements to support it, and how to manage both 
positive and negative social, economic and environmental consequences of this structural 
reconfiguration (International Energy Agency, 2016; Riahi, 2015; UNEP, 2015; World Economic 
Forum, 2015; World Energy Council, 2016a). Behind this work, there is a growing body of both 
academic and policy/advocacy research to better understand and develop this development, by 
analysing the experience of countries on the forefront of this global trend (Adil & Ko, 2016; 
Aldridge, 2008; Beaulieu, Wilde, & Scherpen, 2016; Esteban & Portugal-Pereira, 2014; Goldthau, 
2014; International Energy Agency, 2016; Julian, 2014; McLellan et al., 2015; Riahi, 2015; Sharifi 
& Yamagata, 2016).  
 
Decentralisation is seen by many as the best way of managing the increasing complexity of 
matching energy generation and supply to energy demand (International Energy Agency, 2016; 
Julian, 2014; Riahi, 2015).  Flexibility is a feature of these systems, composed of a myriad of 
smaller investments. Modular systems can respond directly to local energy context, whether these 
demand is growing or contracting, or changing in terms of peaking requirements, for example (Adil 
& Ko, 2016; Goldthau, 2014; Republic of South Africa Department of Energy, 2013; Sharifi & 
Yamagata, 2016). The modularity of these systems has a significant resilience benefit because of 
added redundancy in the system (International Energy Agency, 2016). When disasters strike, 
infrastructure damage can be contained, leading to improved service continuity and less expensive 
disaster response costs (Esteban & Portugal-Pereira, 2014). Another technical advantage is the 
ability to keep pace with innovation. Many small systems can be upgraded incrementally, rather 
than waiting for a single large power station to be decommissioned and then replaced with similar 







In terms of the socio-economic benefits of these systems, because they are comprised of many 
local investors influencing how, where and how much energy is generated, these systems can 
respond to specific or even idiosyncratic local challenges, unlike national energy planning 
(International Energy Agency, 2016; Riahi, 2015). A high level of specialisation to suit local 
conditions has been linked to greater potential for innovation in response to particular issues 
(Goldthau, 2014). In the United States of America (USA), several states and city level governments 
have been aggressively promoting localised energy transitions in the absence of a coherent 
national policy (Ochs & von Fiedeburg, 2014). This work has included facilitating shaping and 
incentivising local smart grid development, often working through or with Municipal Energy 
Companies (MECs), many of which have been privatised. It has also included using solar PV to 
respond to poverty or energy poverty in particular. Several cities, including Washington DC, are 
using subsidised, distributed rooftop solar to target low-income households with the aim of 
decreasing their overall energy expenses, potentially to zero (Ververis et al., 2015). Additionally, 
there are non-governmental projects underway, such as the Brooklyn Microgrid, modelling 
inclusive energy cooperatives that allow for collective solar investments for households of different 
income levels, and direct peer-to-peer energy transactions within these small systems (Brooklyn 
Microgrid, 2016). 
 
A diversity of ownership of renewable energy infrastructure allows for many financial beneficiaries. 
For this reason, it has been very successfully used to foster public acceptance and support for 
renewable energy innovation. For this reason, the transitions in countries, such as Germany and 
Denmark have emphasised broad participation and ownership facilitated through national policy 
(Morris & Pehnt, 2015). Participation has encompassed several community energy cooperatives 
with stakes in local micro-grids (small-scale connected energy sources such as solar panels) and 
utility-scale infrastructure. The ability of ordinary citizens to shape and benefit from the transition to 
decentralised renewables leads some to see decentralisation as a ‘democratisation' of the energy 
sector (Julian, 2014; Morris & Pehnt, 2015). An augmented role for local government in shaping 
their energy sectors, rather than relying on top-down energy policy, is also part of the broadened 
participation in energy policy and decision making. 
 
For national and local governments around the world, however, tasked to ensure a sustainable and 
secure energy supply for all citizens and for agriculture, commerce and industry, the most 
immediately compelling argument for decentralised energy is that it is already happening. 






happening. This is true, even in entirely unconducive contexts such as in the City of Cape Town 
(Jones, 2016a). Large multi-national companies such as Walmart, also active in South Africa, have 
set targets for 100% energy consumption from renewables (Obama, 2017). As national energy 
grids grow and increase in complexity through this transformation in structure, localised 
management makes more sense than trying to direct this complex system only from the top down 
(Riahi, 2015; World Energy Council, 2016a). 
 
Local energy planning management, together with diversified infrastructure and ownership, is 
undermining large centralised national or regional utilities like Eskom that cannot keep up with the 
pace of change of technology, nor the reimagined inclusive governance regimes that it is bringing 
(Goldthau, 2014). As decentralised energy was picked up in international debate and policy 
development, the pushback against it has come in waves. Because energy was traditionally a high 
centralised, regulated sector, the first rounds of decentralisation, were characterised as a 
"seemingly politically contentious form of activism" in the USA, Canada and Australia, at the World 
Energy Council's 2012 session on community ownership (Morris & Pehnt, 2015). Given the 
pressure on existing entrenched institutions and interest networks in the energy sector, this 
characterisation is not surprising. The ‘activism’ has continued undeterred, however. With it, 
municipal governments have come to the fore, pushing a localised renewable energy agenda, 
often in opposition to large existing public and private utilities (Becker et al., 2016).  
 
2.4 Why is the Role of Local Governments in Energy Sectors Transforming? 
Ensuring an optimal and equitable transition to, and operation of, localised, decentralised energy 
grids requires an active policy, governance and investment response (Beaulieu et al., 2016; Camp, 
Hedden, Bohl, Petersen, & Moyer, 2015; Goldthau, 2014; ICLEI, 2015; International Energy 
Agency, 2016; Julian, 2014; Sharifi & Yamagata, 2016; World Energy Council, 2016b).  The 
governance requirement includes: planning to ensure the security of supply; coordination of 
system components; monitoring and optimising performance; developing context appropriate 
pricing strategies; enforcing local regulations; facilitating learning; promoting participation; and 
managing interaction with local developmental challenges such as poverty and inequality. 
 
The role described above need not exclusively be played by a municipal government. However, 
there are some good motivations for extensive municipal engagement in driving, planning and 
administering the localisation of decentralised renewable energy generation. Many of the 
administrative and regulatory requirements for distributed energy such as local urban development 






Furthermore, as outlined below, there are risks and opportunities related to equitable service 
delivery, local economic development, and climate change and resilience that also already fall 
within local governments' scope of authority to manage. 
 
Without an adequate policy and pricing intervention, decentralised energy will disproportionately 
benefit those with the capital to invest in their own or shared infrastructure (Beaulieu et al., 2016; 
Jones, 2016a; Kotzen, Raw, & Atkins, 2014). Many municipalities are mandated to facilitate local 
poverty alleviation and access to service delivery. Especially in the transition from centralised to 
decentralised generation but also as ongoing management of the latter, special measures are 
needed to ensure equitable investment in and benefit from shared smart grid infrastructure that 
supports a local/decentralised energy ecosystem. City and town governments can ensure that 
decentralised energy does not deepen existing socio-economic inequalities, by using tariff design, 
as well as access to infrastructure grants and taxes (Adil & Ko, 2016). Municipalities, such as 
Washington DC noted above, are responding to local poverty and inequality by using solar 
subsidies to ensure that households of all income levels benefit from the transition to decentralised 
renewable energy. Even in the absence of policies to specifically target poverty, research into 
rooftop solar PV uptake in the USA suggests that middle income and not wealthy neighbourhoods 
are benefiting most from this technology. This research has allayed fears that wealthy households 
would benefit, to the detriment of middle and low-income households  (Mazengarb, 2013). 
 
Playing an active role in energy planning this would give municipalities more influence over is a 
critical enabler and constraint on local economic development (LED), local service delivery (as in 
DC), as well as better management of local risks and resilience (C40 & Arup, 2015; Riahi, 2015). 
This is partly because the environmental impacts of carbon-intensive energy development are 
increasingly recognised as having particular localised impacts, falling mainly to city governments to 
manage (Goldthau, 2014; International Energy Agency, 2016; Rodin, 2014). This includes 
increasing instances of extreme weather events causing wide-spread damage to network 
infrastructure. In addition to contributing to GHG mitigation, the resilience benefits of decentralised 
renewable energy reduce recovery costs in the face of natural or manmade disasters (ICLEI, 2015; 
ICLEI Africa, 2015). Cities are also keen to push local green manufacturing opportunities, to drive 
job creation; as well as to improve the quality of local energy access, especially for low-income, 
vulnerable households. This is providing the impetus for a bottom-up displacement of top-down 







The rise of municipal activity in this policy area is strongly linked to the localisation of climate 
change and resilience agendas, and is being advanced through global networks as the 100 
Resilient Cities, ICLEI Local Governments for Sustainability, C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, 
and more (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2013). It is no surprise then, that the Mayors' Declaration on 
Renewable Energy, which lays out a transition to 100% renewable energy by 2050 was signed by 
700 city mayors at COP21 in Paris 2015 (World Energy Council, 2016a).  Each of these networks 
has provided a platform for collectively placing local government renewable energy issues and 
opportunities on the international political agenda, and has also allowed for resources to be 
directed to city and town-level sustainable development. Both 100 Resilient Cities and ICLEI have 
been actively working South Africa, along with GIZ and WWF South Africa that have been 
supporting local governments in their efforts to plan to accommodate decentralised renewables 
(AMEU et al., 2016; Gauché, Rudman, & Silinga, 2015; ICLEI, 2015; WWF, 2015; WWF South 
Africa, 2014).  
 
While municipalities are using international and national platforms to learn and mobilise to increase 
their agency in local energy economies, they are still bound by national legal and policy 
frameworks. The formalisation of increased local government power requires reform of national 
policy, legislative and fiscal arrangements to enable appropriate local energy investment and 
management. While municipal activity in Germany has been supported by the national top-down 
policy framework, an example of the formalisation of municipal authority from the bottom up is 
unfolding in the United Kingdom (UK). Several UK cities now have "devolution deals" in place that 
formally extend powers and fiscal control down to the municipal level systems (World Energy 
Council, 2016a). In the absence of formal devolution of authority, municipal governments can and 
have still made significant inroads. The C40 report, Powering Climate Action: Cities as Global 
Changemakers, states: “two-fifths of all action C40 cities are taking on renewable energy occurs in 
cities with ‘limited’ power to affect energy generation” (C40 & Arup, 2015). One way of thinking 
about the success of these local governments is that they have exercised other ‘horizontal’ forms 
of power through their networks of influence, in the absence of direct delegations of authority. This 
includes, for example, international political influence through networks like C40, relationships with 
local industry, and direct engagement with local energy consumers (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2013).  
2.5 Decentralised Renewable Energy in Practice: the German Energiewende 
2.5.1 Driving decentralisation through national policy 
The reception of renewables, early on, was limited by early iterations of available technology, 






renewable energy uptake could indeed result in a full transition away from other power sources. 
The German ‘Energiewende', is one of the most extensive and ambitious national energy 
transitions. Although not without challenges, it has stuck to its bold commitment. Extensive 
attention has been directed at extracting lessons from Germany's localised energy economies to 
inform other international energy policy (Becker et al., 2016; Beermann & Tews, 2016; De Melo, 
Jannuzzi, & Bajay, 2016; Goldthau, 2014; Hoppe et al., 2015; Julian, 2014; Kemfert et al., 2015; 
Morris & Pehnt, 2015; Nolden, 2013; Quitzow, Roehrkasten, & Jaenicke, 2016; Wassermann, 
Reeg, & Nienhaus, 2015). The German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Economic Development is 
itself committed to monitoring and communicating progress of this transition (German Federal 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy, 2015). An important theme that emerges in relation to the 
Energiewende is its focus on local community and small business ownership3. By 2012 47% of 
renewable energy was being generated by cooperatives and households. 
 
 
Figure 2: Number of German Energy Cooperatives by Year. Data Source: Morris & Pehnt, 2015 
 
The desire to decrease the country’s reliance on energy imports was also a strong motivator 
behind the Energiewende (Morris & Pehnt, 2015). In 2013, Germany spent approximately EU 90 
billion on energy imports (11% of total imports), importing 100% of its uranium and 87.2% of its 
coal. The policy drivers for this energy transition included a legally binding greenhouse gas (GHG) 
reductions of 80–95% by 2050, together with a target of 60% renewable energy by 2050 (German 
Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy, 2015). Community ownership and local 
economic development as a mechanism for driving social acceptance of new energy infrastructure. 
                                                 
 
 
3 NREL published a report in 2009 using wind power plants to build an argument that local ownership generated greater 


















The increase in renewables has led to the development of a ‘green economy’ sector based on the 
uptake of renewable energy, particularly green technology manufacturing, as well as substantial 
research and development investment has led to 370,000 new jobs (Morris & Pehnt, 2015). In 
terms of support national policy support for decentralised energy, the Renewable Energy Act 
allows for preferential tariffs to ensure that small-scale generation is financially viable. 
Furthermore, approval of energy projects is formally devolved to the local government level.  
2.5.2 The role of municipal governments in the Energiewende 
After a period of privatisation of local utilities, decentralised renewable energy in Germany has 
ushered in a wave of greater municipal influence in local energy systems and economies. A 
process of "remunicipalisation" with full or partial local government control reinstated, alongside 
strategies to allow for greater citizen influence over energy investments, including the formation of 
cooperatives to manage local smart grids (Becker et al., 2016; Beermann & Tews, 2016; Julian, 
2014). In response to environmental concerns, citizen-led anti-nuclear movements, and national 
energy policy, local governments have set ambitious local targets. The city of Frankfurt, for 
example, has set a 100% renewable energy target and is using the integration of waste to energy 
and heat recovery to contribute to the achievement of this goal (Riahi, 2015). It has also 
established an independent Energy Agency that plays a research, advisory and coordinating role 
for energy stakeholders, including local utilities. This partnership between public and private actors 
seen as critical to enact effective city-level energy policy and investment.  
2.5.3 Challenges with decentralisation 
The German Energiewende has not been without its challenges. Without going into extensive 
detail, there are some salient lessons for other countries embarking on the same trajectory. 
Problems include a lack of coordination of bottom-up experimentation and investment leading to 
issues of national grid overload, as well as a remaining mismatch between where energy is 
generated and where it is required (Beermann & Tews, 2016). Local actors are responding to local 
incentives, rather than balancing the national energy system. This includes social opposition to 
private sector-owned utility scale infrastructure. There has also been a lag in local smart grid 
development, outpaced by private investment in distributed renewable generation (Wassermann et 
al., 2015).  
2.6 Risks, Costs and Trade-offs in the Transition between Centralised and 
Decentralised Energy Sectors 
Energy transitions to decentralised renewables based systems need not follow the same path. 






country could first introduce a competitive renewable programme, with highly centralised planning 
and procurement (P1), as with South Africa's REIPPPP. In contrast, decentralisation can be built 
into a country's national decarbonisation strategy (P2), as in this case of Germany, discussed 
above. Even where national policy has moved energy sectors along P1 only, however, private 
sector investment, as well as municipal level politics is still moving some systems along a third 
pathway, P3, pushing from the ground up for broader and more localised distribution of power, in 
tension with national policy and regulatory frameworks. 
 
Figure 3: Pathways to decentralisation 
Regardless of the path followed, the choice for decentralisation need not be seen as a zero-sum 
game. In fact, there are good reasons for maintaining aspects of national planning, with national 
energy sectors falling somewhere on a continuum between quadrants B and C. Reasons for this 
balancing act include: integrating existing generation networks with new energy sources; 
facilitating and monitoring adequate shared investments in peaking plants and transmission and 
distribution grids; and managing spatial disparities and inequality between subnational regions.  
Literature suggests that a combination of bottom-up local planning and overarching national policy 
is required for an optimal decentralised energy system (International Energy Agency, 2016; Sharifi 
& Yamagata, 2016). This issue will be relevant throughout the next two chapters, as the opposing 








There are significant issues with rapid or consummate decentralisation that surface tensions 
between national and subnational level interests and priorities. What makes sense at a local level, 
within a city or province, for example, may not make sense at a national level. The German case 
shows that local incentives to drive energy infrastructure investment can be at odds with national 
infrastructure capacity. Additionally, considering the bottom-up proliferation of small-scale 
renewable energy, it should be noted that literature suggests that large utility scale infrastructure 
may well deliver better overall cost efficiencies, which need be considered when designing national 
energy policy (Morris & Pehnt, 2015). Some form of central coherent and inclusive facilitation and 
coordination of bottom-up decentralisation can allow for conflicts and trade-offs to be identified and 
managed (Beermann & Tews, 2016).  
 
Furthermore, equitable distribution of the risks and opportunities arising from switching to 
renewable technology need to be considered. If the first households, companies and cities to 
benefit from distributed generation and procurement are those with the most capital and capacity, 
then the burden of financing less efficient exiting energy infrastructure and the public/private 
utilities that manage them, is left to those with the least ability with no choice to opt out (Beaulieu et 
al., 2016; Jones, 2016a; Kotzen et al., 2014). The greater existing inequalities within and between 
regions in a country, the more complex this challenge becomes. There are several challenges 
within this, relating to local data availability and internal capacity to manage urban energy systems 
(Sharifi & Yamagata, 2016). Within this, there is a specific need to consider the distribution of risks 
associated with managing intermittency in the context of improving technology. Despite the rapid 
pace of technological development, such as the possibility of solving the storage conundrum, there 
are certain large central investments in stable generation that are either required or have already 
been made in the interest of ensuring national energy security. This includes existing national 
networks of coal-fired power plants and natural gas investments intended to ensure continuity of 
energy supply. Most of the German regions that have adopted 100% renewable energy strategies 
have remained connected to the national grid (Beermann & Tews, 2016). As the intermittency 
problem is solved, there is the possibility that these investments will be left stranded.  
 
2.7 Concluding comments 
It is clear that the technological and financial viability of renewable energy generation from micro to 
small-scale, to utility scale, lends itself towards decentralisation. This refers to both the introduction 
of diverse energy sources and modes of infrastructure ownership, and to decentralisation of 
energy planning, governance, distribution, management and procurement. This second aspect of 






connected to existing local government mandates and local government priorities directly. While 
municipal policy or management might be accompanied by private or non-governmental 
participation, it is clear that local authorities can support their climate change and environmental, 
LED and equitable service delivery mandates by playing a role in their municipal energy sectors. 
Local government participation can enable coordination with national energy policy, regulatory and 
investment, but this is not a necessary outcome, as demonstrated in the German case. 
 
The answer to the question of how much decentralisation is optimal is bound by local context. In 
Germany, a pioneer not without challenges, decentralisation has been very extensive, driven by 
comprehensive and decisive national policy. Considering some of the tensions between bottom-up 
and top-down transformation or steering of energy systems, it is clear that these issues can and do 
manifest differently in different context. For the purposes of this analysis, looking at the South 
African case, Germany's wholesale sector reform strategy does not immediately make sense. 
Nonetheless, as explored in the following chapter, the historical role of municipalities within the 
national energy sector are still changing, and decentralised energy is becoming an undeniable 
reality demanding local and national responses. Local governments are tentatively pushing the 
energy sector in the direction of quadrant C in Figure 3.  The existing role of municipalities makes 
them an obvious candidate to drive and plan for a reasonable share of localised private and public 
renewable energy generation and to manage local smart grids. The mechanisms for achieving this 
transformation are currently being developed, despite highly centralised, historically immutable 







3 Localised Energy Generation in South Africa: The 
Expanding Authority of Municipal Governments 
3.1 Introduction 
Building on the international case for decentralised renewable energy, the augmented role for local 
governments, and the particular opportunity for local governments in South Africa, this chapter 
explores the hypothesis that, through incremental experimentation and learning, municipalities in 
South Africa have slowly expanded their role in the national energy sector. It does so by tracing 
how various metropolitan (cities) and local (towns) municipal governments conducted research, 
pilot projects, and developed policies to prepare for local, decentralised renewable energy 
generation, between 2008 and the end of 2016. By carefully examining the parallel development of 
local investments and policy at local and national levels, it is argued that municipalities have 
extended their agency in the energy. The earliest actions were to enable local small-scale 
embedded generation (SSEG). This SSEG is mainly rooftop solar panels that businesses and 
households install to meet their respective needs, with surplus energy feeding back into the gr id to 
be distributed along with conventional Eskom-generated electricity. 
 
From these tentative initial steps, it is shown how, more recently, some municipalities have also 
been making direct investments in decentralised renewable energy for use in public facilities. This 
activity has been focused in four directions: 
1) Developing the capacity, infrastructure, regulations and financial framework for residential 
and commercial SSEG; 
2) Allowing ‘wheeling’ (distribution) of privately generated electricity directly to other private 
consumers; 
3) Exploring opportunities for municipal investment in and ownership of renewable energy 
generation; and 
4) Partnering with private entities to procure renewable energy for official municipal 
consumption. 
The first two actions facilitate and promote others to invest in and benefit from localised energy 
projects. The second two are examples of municipal direct investment or ownership. All four 
clusters, however, decrease dependency on Eskom's network of large, mainly coal-fired power 
stations. 
 
After examining the role of municipal governments in the energy sector in some detail, an overview 






legislative and regulatory landscape are not supportive of these undertakings. This overview of 
relevant regulations defines the context in which municipalities have used small windows of 
opportunity to implement projects to determine local regulations, as well as influencing national 
regulations and policy, all while demonstrating an increasing potential of a workable alternative to 
Eskom's dominance. This narrative is established by tracing standardise engagements with each 
other and with NERSA, through platforms such as the South African Local Government 
Association (SALGA), with various local NGOs, and with assistance from other international city 
governments to implement a variety of decentralised renewable energy initiatives (AMEU et al., 
2016). This work represents a significant departure from the historical role of municipalities in the 
energy sector. South African municipalities are constitutionally mandated to manage the local 
reticulation of electricity. This role envisioned for local governments in the energy sector is mainly 
administrative, with municipal governments acting as local utilities that buy and sell Eskom's 
power. 
 
To concretise the argument that municipalities are defining a new de facto energy mandate from 
the bottom up, this chapter traces the evolution of decentralised energy policy development and 
implementation in the City of Cape Town, the Western Cape Province in which the City is situated, 
and Drakenstein Municipality. It is argued that initiatives driven at a local level have increased the 
range of possible municipal actions in the energy sector, as well as formalising these through local 
policy, and slow but possibly enduring impact on national energy policy and regulation. The 
chapter ends with a brief overview of the current state of play in which municipalities find their 
decentralised renewable energy work in opposition to new national nuclear power procurement.   
 
3.2 The Case for Municipalities to Drive Decentralised Renewable Energy in 
South Africa  
There is a strong case for the promotion of decentralised renewable energy generation in South 
Africa, steered by municipal governments, as an active component of the overarching national 
energy sector. South African municipalities find themselves with access to technology, and models 
of enabling finance and policy to reform their electricity service delivery models to enhance their 
promotion equitable energy access. There are specific opportunities for municipalities to utilise 






as to change the way that they deliver electricity to households that qualify for a free energy 
allocation under the Free Basic Energy Policy (Republic of South Africa Department of Minerals 
and Energy, 2003a) 4.  
 
Decentralised energy planning and management would not require ‘remunicipalisation’ as in the 
German case explored in Chapter 2 because municipalities already play a significant role. 184 
Local governments in South Africa already exploit their mandate to invest in, maintain and upgrade 
local electricity distribution grid infrastructure, and manage associated tariffs, fees and equitable 
access issues. It makes sense that as these local continue to be developed, that the infrastructure 
can accommodate decentralised energy infrastructure. Nationally, the grid is currently designed to 
facilitate the transmission of energy from large, stable generation (like a coal-fired power station) 
(Camp et al., 2015; Jones, 2016a). As local grids gradually become ‘smart’, South African 
municipalities can play the energy planning and servicing role required for optimal management of 
localised electricity production and consumption (ICLEI, 2015). Keeping this ‘distribution' role as a 
public function would allow for the administration of equitable service delivery and infrastructure 
finance, a significant concern in the context of South Africa's deeply unequal cities and towns. 
 
Existing policy has created space for low-carbon growth and decentralised energy. It has allowed 
South African local governments to work with the NERSA since 2008. Both metro and non-metro 
municipalities have been experimenting with the incorporation of SSEG into their distribution of 
Eskom-generated electricity (AMEU et al., 2016; Jones, 2016a). Returning to the conceptual 
framework introduced in Chapter 2, this activity can be seen as pushing the South African energy 
sector in the direction of Quadrant C in Figure 3 (p27). Responding to both this local 
experimentation and international trends and models, NERSA attempted to standardise this 
through the Standard Conditions for Embedded Generation within Municipal Boundaries (NERSA, 
2011). Though these guidelines are woefully inadequate, and progress has been frustrated and 
slow, they can be improved, and local governments in South Africa have the benefit of learning 
from the experiences of local governments in diverse countries, as well as an enhanced menu of 
technological options, compared with early movers in this area. 
 
                                                 
 
 
4 It has been estimated that the cost of delivering free energy for a metropolitan municipality can exceed R1 billion 






3.3 Evidence of Bottom-up Municipal Energy Sector Transformation  
South African municipalities have expanded their role in the energy sector, from a very narrowly 
defined base, developed for a context before the rise of renewables. They have historically had 
little official or legislated power to determine where, how and how much electricity is generated, as 
well as the cost, procurement and financing of that generation. These functions have always been 
centralised, first, shrouded in secrecy, with Eskom under the apartheid administration. After 1994, 
the policy-setting role for the Department of Minerals and Energy (DME), which later became the 
Department of Energy (DoE), was made official. Despite various attempts at reform, first formally 
proposed in the ambitious 1998 Energy White Paper, Eskom remains mandated to, "provide 
electricity in an efficient and sustainable manner; this includes the generation, transmission, 
distribution and sale thereof" (Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd, 2016). Under the DoE and the Minister of 
Energy, with input and oversight from the Minister of Public Enterprises and Cabinet, Eskom 
maintains a dominant position. There is no aspect of the energy sector in which the state-owned 
company (SOC) does not play a substantial role.  
 
Within this centralised configuration of power, local electricity reticulation falls under the service 
delivery functions over which municipalities have executive and administrative authority. This 
mandate is stipulated in Sections 156 (1) and (2) of the South African Constitution (Republic of 
South Africa, 1996)5. In practice, the definition of this authority has included a few instances of 
local governments operating coal-fired power stations, which they own and which were already 
established pre-1994. The City of Cape Town (CCT), for example, revived the now defunct Athlone 
Power Station to provide additional capacity during peak demand periods, between 1995 and 
2003; and the City of Johannesburg (CJ) still operates Kelvin to meet local energy demand (de 
Vos, 2015; Government Technical Advisory Centre, 2015). More generally, however, reticulation 
means buying Eskom's electricity for local resale.  The power to invest in municipal electricity 
generation, or even to benefit directly from the national government or private energy investments 
within or adjacent to municipal boundaries, has remained a matter of national level discretion, and 
it is not a legal mandate of local or provincial governments. 
 
Municipalities are dependent on the governance, decisions and infrastructure of Eskom. The SOC 
sells 48% of the energy it generates, through the national transmission grid that it owns, to 184 
licensed municipalities (out of a total of 278) that choose to exercise their right to distribute 
                                                 
 
 






electricity (OECD, 2015a). Those municipalities that do not have the capacity to perform this 
function relinquish this role to Eskom. Those that do then sell on to residential and commercial 
clients, at a margin that is intended to recover costs associated with the distribution grid. Within a 
given municipality, however, Eskom may still engage in direct distribution to industrial, commercial 
and some residential customers. The price of electricity and proportional contribution to revenues 
is unique to each particular municipality, but at a national level, the overall contribution to municipal 
revenue was 28.8% (StatsSA, 2016). These revenues fund municipal functions beyond only 
electricity. The idiosyncratic pricing strategies of various local governments have been criticised for 
being unclear and resulting in inflated electricity costs. 
 
As electricity distributors, municipalities face several ongoing challenges: the inadequate collection 
of electricity bills; inaccurate metering; and no real-time user data to enable time-sensitive 
charging6. Eskom's increasing tariffs directly impact local governments. Having become dependent 
on artificially low electricity prices under apartheid, these increases, while necessary, have not 
been easy to manage. 
 
Table 1: Annual tariff increases versus inflation. Data Source: Parsons, Krugell, & Keeton, 2015 
Year Average approved tariff increase % Average yearly inflation % 
2008 27.5 11.5 
2009 31.3 7.1 
2010 24.8  4.3 
2011 25.8 5.0 
2012 16.0 5.7  
2013 8.0 5.7 
2014 8.0 6.1 
 
Many municipalities are in arrears on their payments to Eskom. By 31 March 2016, the amount 
owed had increased to R6 billion (including interest), from R5 billion a year earlier (Eskom 
Holdings SOC Ltd, 2016). As a result, 60 municipalities have signed payment plans with Eskom 
(19 of the top 20 defaulters). Some municipalities are paying as little as 18% of their total electricity 
                                                 
 
 
6. Accurate information is required to implement different pricing for different times of the day. The result is that utilities 
can charge more when the demand for electricity is highest. Flexible pricing supports more extensive revenue collection, 
while also encouraging more moderate consumption when the grid is under the most stress during peak consumption 






bills. Whether this full amount is, in fact, recoverable is questionable. Eskom's financial position, as 
well as historical under-pricing of electricity that failed to account for the cost of upgrading and 
replacing old infrastructure, has led to several successive price increases since 2008. For 2015, 
NERSA approved increases of 12.69% for Eskom's direct customers (effective 1 April) and 14.25% 
for municipalities (effective 1 July 2015) (Eskom Media Desk, 2015). Eskom made an application 
to NERSA to raise tariffs again within the same financial year, which would have resulted in a 
cumulative 25% increase. Eskom sited capital expenditure of R22.8 billion needed to avoid load 
shedding as the primary reason for this increase. Because NERSA rejected the request, Eskom 
made a further submission in November, which followed a process of stakeholder consultation with 
unions, energy users, and government, across six provinces. An increase of 9.4% was approved in 
March 2016, for the 2016/17 financial year. 
 
Going directly against this trend of increasing electricity prices, the renewable energy investments 
that DoE has made under the REIPPPP has delivered cheaper energy over each successive 
round of procurement (GreenCape, 2016d). Because Eskom connects these privately-owned 
power plants to the national transmission grid, and to purchase their power for resale, the cost-
savings associated with this relatively small proportion of energy generation, are internalised. Local 
governments do not feel them.  Electricity purchases constitute the second largest category of 
expenditure for local governments. As costs increase, total spending is growing significantly. Total 
municipal spending rose by 21,9% to R87,5 billion in the June 2016 quarter, from R71,7 billion in 
the March 2016 quarter (StatsSA, 2016). Municipal electricity sales totalled R23,1 billion over the 
same period (compared with R18 billion spent). 
 
 





























The relationship between Eskom and municipalities is not well designed. In addition to increasing 
overall electricity prices, there is a mismatch between the buying and selling price structures for 
local governments. Municipalities buy electricity from Eskom on a 'time of use' tariff, which is 
determined by the level of demand at different times of the day. At peak consumption times, in the 
morning and early evening, electricity costs local governments more. Municipalities sell this 
electricity to residential and commercial consumers using a different fee structure, an inclined 
block tariff, for which price is influenced only by the user's average level of consumption (Kotzen et 
al., 2014). This mismatch in pricing means they lose out on revenue at times when consumption is 
highest.  
 
There is, however, a compelling motivation for using an inclined block tariff. It is one of few 
mechanisms to achieve increased local equity in access to services. This is because the level of 
energy consumption is used as a proxy for household income. The intended result is that relatively 
wealthier households pay more per unit of energy than poorer households that use fewer 
appliances. In practice, this cross-subsidises not only energy for low-income households but many 
other services too. Threats to electricity sales undermine current arrangements for local grid 
maintenance and service delivery for low-income households(Jones, 2016a).  
 
The inefficiency of the role of municipalities in the energy sector has been a matter of concern for 
the country's new democratic national government from early on. In May 1997, Cabinet approved 
the proposal that the electricity distribution industry (EDI) should be consolidated to fix what was 
seen as the inconsistencies and problems of the current system. The 1998 White Paper expanded 
on this proposal, prescribing the consolidation of all distribution activities under five state-owned 
regional electricity distributors (REDs) (Republic of South Africa Department of Minerals and 
Energy, 1998). It also proposed tariff structure adjustments, with transparent costs for 
electrification, separating these out from other municipal service delivery. National government 
efforts to reform EDI were continuously frustrated but continued despite municipal pushback. In 
1999, it was proposed that there would be six REDs, managed under a new SOC, EDI Holdings 
(Public Affairs Research Institute, 2013). This was the outcome of a strenuous effort to ensure an 
equitable distribution of subsidised energy distribution for low-income households and profitable 
distribution to commercial customers, within the functional operational footprint of each RED. 







The death knell for this reform was sounded when the first RED was established in 2005. It was 
swiftly and successfully challenged on the grounds that it curtailed the constitutional authority of 
municipal governments. There was some renewed energy behind EDI reform in 2009, after the 
commencement of load-shedding. A constitutional amendment bill was proposed to enable the 
REDs to continue by re-stating municipal authority in this sphere. This was finally abandoned by 
Cabinet in 2010, with EDI Holdings closed, putting pay to the idea of EDI reform, and maintaining 
the complex role of municipal governments in the energy system. 
 
This is the context in which localised renewables have been introduced in South Africa. 
Municipalities are exploring an alternative to an existing energy sector in which they play a passive 
role. They have had to be very cautious in this exploration of private renewable energy generation 
within their boundaries. The transition from being utilities that distribute Eskom's electricity, to a 
more sophisticated manager of a local grid in which many different energy sources are optimally 
distributed, involve dismantling and restructuring a major revenue stream. The fear is that 
increased private generation will result in decreased demand for conventional municipally 
distributed electricity, specifically from wealthier households and businesses that can afford the 
capital investment for solar PV or similar. 
 
Despite this initial ambivalence, since as far back as 2008, some municipalities have been 
tentatively exploring options for SSEG – that is mostly rooftop solar PV for private consumption, 
with surplus energy feeding into the grid. The promotion of small-scale PV is part of a suite of 
subnational policy options to drive local energy security through decentralised energy generation 
(Fakir, 2015). Presently, private investment in residential and commercial solar PV is happening, 
but slowly and in a haphazard way, with households and businesses motivated by increasing 
energy costs. Also on the table is the possibility of municipal-owned infrastructure. Investment in 
municipal-owned energy infrastructure is legal, but subject to NERSA's slow regulatory process, 
and all new utility-scale generation (larger than 5MW) requires approval from the Minister of 
Energy. 
 
Despite a variable historical performance, there is tremendous potential to build on this new area 
of energy planning at a municipal level, to arrive at a better set of arrangements to ensure 
adequate, sustainable energy to support LED and human development. Some municipalities are 
attempting to reimagine their role in the energy system in a way that preserves or possibly 
expands their power and revenue security. The greatest opportunity lies in facilitative both 






investment. That is infrastructure under the 5MW capacity threshold, although typically these 
installations fall under 1MW7. Anything larger is considered a utility scale installation, and subject 
to more complex regulatory processes, the immutability of which is evidenced by Eskom’s 
enduring monopoly over energy generation.  In practice, this includes a wide range of scales, from 
a single solar panel on a house, to a solar microgrid (collection of panels) to power a 
neighbourhood.  
 
Table 2: Summary of typical renewable energy installation size in South Africa. Source: GreenCape, 2016 
Scale Infrastructure Size 
Small Residential Rooftop Solar  Typically, under 10kW 
Commercial, industrial or community owned installations Typically, 10kW-1MW 
Small-scale renewable energy installations procured under 
REIPPPP 
1MW-5MW 
Other small-scale renewable energy installations, not defined 
under REIPPPP 
Up to 5MW 
Utility Large-scale installations procured under REIPPPP Larger than 5MW 
 
It can also include a variety of sources: solar, wind, hydro, and waste-to-energy. Some 
municipalities are seizing opportunities and building legal procedures to procure renewable energy 
directly from REIPPPP independent power producers (IPPs) (Lucy Baker et al., 2015). For all this 
decentralised investment to have a social benefit for cities and towns, a proactive response is 
required from municipal governments to enable the energy to feed into the grid safely and legally 
(Camp et al., 2015). Widespread uptake of localised generation will require not only a well-
maintained grid, but one that is upgraded to deal with distributed generation, higher levels of 
intermittency from these sources, and adequate metering to measure, plan for and bill privately 
generated electricity feeding into the local distribution grid8 (Camp et al., 2015).  This will require a 
dramatic improvement in the management of local energy infrastructure, and a plan to finance the 
investment backlog totalling an estimated R35 billion in 2012 (OECD, 2015a). 
 
Despite a challenging environment, in which opportunities to influence national energy policy have 
been increasingly scarce, municipal governments are awake to the global shifts towards more 
                                                 
 
 
7 According to the Solar Energy Industry Association (SEIA) of America, the current national average for the number of 
households powered by 1MW of installed solar PV is 164 (Solar Energy Industry Association (SEIA), 2015). This is 
based on the average performance of systems divided by the average annual electricity consumed by households. 






decentralised, locally sensitive, diverse and resilient energy systems. Additionally, many 
municipalities are seeing energy sector crises as a signal of the inevitable transition to a greener, 
more decentralised system (Government Technical Advisory Centre, 2015; Greyling, 2016; 
Mkosana, 2016; WWF, 2015). Various stakeholders articulated this view in 2015, at the Economies 
of Regions Learning Network (ERLN), an initiative of the Government Technical Assistance Centre 
(GTAC), a part National Treasury. ERLN convened a learning exchange network on embedded 
generation and other renewable energy opportunities for local government that was 
enthusiastically received (Government Technical Advisory Centre, 2015). This event revealed the 
extent of local government activity in renewable energy. Despite a broadly disabling environment 
and a history of variable performance in the energy sector, stakeholders reported assistance from 
within the DoE, NERSA and National Treasury on a range of relatively successful projects. With 
this support, municipalities have identified and acted on investment opportunities in various stages 
of completion, both facilitating and directly investing in decentralised renewable energy. These 






Table 3: Local energy generation options. Sources: Government Technical Advisory Centre, 2015; ICLEI Africa, 
2015; Janisch, 2016; Mkosana, 2016; Resource Management Services, 2015; SALGA, 2015  
 
 
In addition to the ERLN, advisory work has also been undertaken by GIZ and WWF South Africa, 
as well as technical learning exchanges between particular governments, for example between the 
Western Cape Government and the Government of Bavaria in Germany. SALGA has been an 
important vehicle for this advisory support, along with the Association of Municipal Electricity 
Utilities (AMEU) (AMEU et al., 2016; SALGA, 2015). Together with Sustainable Energy Africa 
(SEA), SALGA has created the Urban Energy Support Website to allow for knowledge sharing and 
technical support for municipalities (SALGA & Sustainable Energy Africa, 2016). 
Municipal 
Role
Local generation infrastrucure 
option
Scale Grid-tied Ownership options Description Regulatory requirements
Facilitation
1.     Commercial, Industrial & 
Agriculural small-scale embedded 
generation
Up to 1MW yes Private (Business)
Predominantly solar rooftop PV (but can be 
alternative source) grid-tied generation to 
supplement own consumption.  
Limited implementation in several 












Private (Company or 
non-profit)
Rooftop PV installation with grid connection 
to supplement consumption; surplus energy 
FIT.








4.     Community microgrids (small-
scale)





Private (Company or 
non-profit)
Public (Municipality)
Rooftop or centralised micro-grid system to 
supply power to a cluster of homes. This can 
be a cost-effective way of providing power 
as nano-grids can deliver some of the 
benefit of being grid-tied without the 
expense of extending national grid 
infrastructure. It can also be funded through 
public or donor funding, or small individual 
contributions.
Limited examples of implementation, 
including the Ishack in Stellenbosch 
Municipality. There are several private 
projects currently being developed. This 
infrastructure is currently being explored for 









5.     PPA (wheeling agreement) 
with utility scale IPP (under 
REIPPPP)
% of total 
generation 
capacity to be 
determined
yes Private (IPP)
Power bought directly from an IPP for 
distribution via the local grid to businesses 
or households. 
Implemented in Nelson Mandela Bay 
Municipality.




6.     Public-private partnership 
(PPP) with Independent Power 
Producer for small-scale 
infrastructure
Up to 5MW yes
Private (IPP)
Public (Municipality)
Power procured directly from an IPP for 
distribution via the local grid to businesses 
or households, or for use by the 
municipality.
Nelson Mandela Bay is currently in the 
procurement phase of a process for waste-
to-energy facilities in this category.
Requires approval by NERSA
Requires approval by National 




7.     Public-private partnership 
(PPP) with Independent Power 







This could include solar PV, wind, or waste 
to energy solutions. The scale and payback 
period (spanning more than three years) 
would, under the Municipal Finance 
Management Act of 1998, necessitate 
establishing a PPP between the municipality 
and the IPP (Technical Assistance Unit and 
Western Cape Government, 2014). 
Drakenstein municipality has designed a 
facitlity in this category (see case study).
Requires a Section 34 Ministerial 
Determination
Requires approval by NERSA





2.     Municipal small-scale 
embedded generation
Up to 1MW yes
Public (Municipality or 
other government)
Predominantly solar rooftop PV grid-tied 
generation to supplement own consumption 
for government buildings.
Feasibility study undertaken by Western 







3.4 Charting a way through the Limiting Existing Regulatory Framework for 
Municipal Energy Generation 
The decentralised energy investments undertaken and enabled for local consumption are not 
illegal, nor are they explicitly regulated. NERSA oversees all energy generation licencing, pricing, 
tariffs, distribution, sale and infrastructure installations. In 2011, NERSA responded to the 
concerns and initial work undertaken by municipal governments since 2008, by publishing the 
Standard Conditions for Embedded Generation within Municipal Boundaries (hereafter "Standard 
Conditions"). The Standard Conditions devolved the power to register and connect private 
embedded energy generators up to 100kW (0.1MW) to municipalities, which were deemed the 
appropriate level of authority to manage this scale of generation (NERSA, 2011). These 
regulations allow small-scale generators to sell power to municipalities and to be compensated for 
energy generated without having to go through any national vetting or approval. They do not 
specifically speak to municipal investment in generation, nor do they accommodate community 
microgrids, nor larger commercial installations (like the small-scale infrastructure that is allowed to 
be procured under REIPPPP, which fall between 1MW and 5MW). 
 
The document has been heavily criticised for its opacity, and by NERSA's account, "the document 
was approved without due public consultations and is not clear to most stakeholders" (NERSA, 
2015b). The Standard Conditions leave systems between 100kW and 1MW entirely unregulated. 
Furthermore, the document requires municipalities to draft specific regulations to make these 
guidelines workable in their local environments. They have remained widely unimplemented for the 
past five years because municipalities were never confident as to the legal status of the guidelines, 
which also failed to provide guidance on critical technical and financial aspects of local embedded 
generation. As evidenced in the City of Cape Town case study, below, some of the larger 
metropolitan municipalities did go ahead with the development of local regulations, however, which 
were informed by their shared experiences with pilot small-scale solar PV installations.  
 
In response to municipal requests and technical input, given that municipalities continued to work 
on decentralised energy, in February 2015 NERSA released a consultation paper entitled, Small-
Scale Embedded Energy Regulatory Rules for energy systems up to 1MVA (equal to 1MW) 
(hereafter "Small-Scale Regulations"). The draft Small-scale Regulations specify national 
standards for municipalities to register small-scale energy generators up to 1MW to feed surplus 
energy into local distribution grids with guidelines for associated fees and compensation (NERSA, 






municipal registration of these systems, but with an increase in the generation capacity cap, now 
up to 1MW. The regulations specify, among other things: 
1. Technical assessments of network capacity and total cumulative generated capacity to be 
undertaken and recorded; 
2. Reporting requirements for NERSA; 
3. Standards for generation systems, grid connection and metering; and 
4. Tariffs structures to recover all fixed costs, including connection, metering and grid 
maintenance, as well as incentivising private investment 
Essentially, the Small-Scale Regulations require that municipalities account, plan and invest for the 
increased local generation from private PV installations. The regulations propose a two-phase tariff 
system, with the first being simple net-metering of generators that also use the grid, and the 
second possibly requiring a single intermediary body, a Central Power Purchasing Agency to 
administer small-scale energy and compensation schemes on behalf of individual municipalities 
(NERSA, 2015b). 
 
The improved Small-Scale Regulations would replace the ineffective 2011 Standard Conditions, 
with buy-in facilitated through extensive consultation with municipalities and other stakeholders. 
The regulations would create a solution for potential municipal revenue losses, and would also 
help to mitigate load-shedding risks. Many municipalities, private investors and other interested 
parties did provide extensive comments, eagerly awaiting this long overdue framework. Despite 
this enthusiastic response, NERSA overshot its May 2015 deadline and remained vague on the 
completion date for the regulations for next several months. While the legal status of this document 
is still unclear (as at 1 January 2016), the Standard Conditions are still the only ‘regulation' in place 
for municipal actions for decentralised renewables. The document was used by various municipal 
governments to catalyse the range of activities listed in Table 3, which have also far exceeded its 
scope and intended focus on rooftop solar power (Jones, 2016a). In terms of defining the 
regulatory space for decentralised energy, municipal governments are bound by Schedule 2 of the 
Electricity Regulation Act, which allows for operation without an electricity generation license under 
the following conditions:  
• Any generation capacity constructed and operated for demonstration purposes only and not 
connected to an interconnected power supply. 
• Any generation capacity constructed and operated for own use. 








In addition to the Standard Conditions, all municipal activities with respect to energy are governed 
by the Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA), which governments all financial matters, 
including revenues and procurement  (Republic of South Africa, 2004; Technical Assistance Unit 
and Western Cape Government, 2014). The MFMA is particularly challenging for energy 
procurement, because, under Section 33, it limits contracting periods to one year or three years in 
the case of sufficient motivation. Longer contracting periods are usually subject to the 
establishment of PPPs, with long lead times and arduous public participation requirements and 
external approvals. This is significant because it applies to all "Direct Ownership/Investment" 
initiatives in Table 3.  
3.5  Tracing the Pathway to Expanded Municipal Authority in the Western 
Cape 2008-2016 
The slow, but steady progress of municipal work on decentralised renewable energy generation is 
evident in the Western Cape Province. The Western Cape Government (WCG) is an opposition-
led government. WCG sees energy as a major risk to the economy (Western Cape Government 
Provincial Treasury, 2015). To illustrate, the Western Cape Infrastructure Framework, May 2013, 
notes: “The current deficits and uncertainties lie in the capacity to generate and source electricity 
to support an increased growth in demand. The energy focus in the province is on lowering the 
carbon footprint, with an emphasis on renewable and locally generated energy” (Palmer & 
Graham, 2013). This has meant that there has been a climate of political support for decentralised 
renewable energy in the province, which has also been mirrored in many of the local governments 
that fall within its territory. The City of Cape Town (CCT) has led the way in terms of both 
capitalising on this political will and converting it into actual energy projects and regulations. CCT 
has also been influential in pushing NERSA for clarification, feeding into both the 2011 Standard 
Conditions and the 2016 Small-Scale Regulations. Together with WCG, and various other 
organisations, from 2008 to 2016, the growth of clear policies and regulations to allow for SSEG, 
and to implement other decentralised renewable energy investments has been significant. 
 
The case studies below plot key events in the CCT (and relates this to progress in the rest of the 
province) and Drakenstein Municipality, respectively. Each case demonstrates how these 
municipalities have actively developed their agency by working locally, while working through 
various platforms to augment learning and progress, and to lobby NERSA for increased leeway to 
develop decentralised renewable energy, locally. Through these actions, they have expanded their 
role from a limited scope of electricity distribution and local implementation of the Integrated 






grids – to a range of direct and indirect energy investments to meet local electricity consumption 
demand. 
3.5.1 Case 1: The City of Cape Town Leading the Way 
The CCT has been one of the most proactive municipalities in terms of SSEG in the country. This 
has been pushed from its Electricity Department (ED), which is responsible for electricity 
distribution to residential and commercial customers. Like with many municipalities, local electricity 
distribution is complicated by the fact that the municipality is not the sole actor in this 
area(Greyling, 2016). The City only distributes 75% of electricity within the municipal boundary, 
while Eskom distributes the remaining 25% electricity directly to particular customers (City of Cape 
Town, 2016). Since CCT began to look into localised generation and connecting this to the local 
grid, the solutions it has developed have never applied to the 25% of Eskom's customers. On the 
City-owned grid, however, there are more than 40 substations, which allow for energy to feed into 
the grid, which can then be redistributed and sold in the same way that all other municipal 
electricity is sold. 
 
When ED officials began to think seriously about small-scale embedded energy in 2008, it was in 
response to international energy trends, and the increasing uptake of solar PV. Given the CCT's 
dependence on energy sales to middle and upper-income households and businesses for revenue 
generation, and specifically also to finance service delivery low-income households, this was the 
initial frame for investigations. The focus was on potential cost-recovery strategies that ensured 
continued equitable service delivery, adequate infrastructure investment, and the sustainability of 
Eskom's financial model. Despite these complications, the ED department saw an opportunity to 
purchase electricity from businesses and households with solar panels that are embedded in the 
municipality's local grid, (Jones, 2016a). The strategy was not to displace Eskom generation, but 
rather to capitalise on small-scale private investment in solar PV, biogas, and small-scale 
hydropower, to ensure local energy security. This was in the context of Eskom's failing 
infrastructure and load shedding, which commenced in the same year. Provincial and local 
governments have explored some creative energy demand-side management has been used to 
limit their exposure to load shedding, and SSEG was considered a viable strategy in this regard. 
 
CCT was joined in their concerns by Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality (NMBM), which is also very 
active in the green energy space. Together, representatives from both municipalities approached 
NERSA to enquire about the possibility and potential of SSEG (SALGA, 2015). A regulatory gap 
was identified for SSEG, with early conversations focused on rooftop solar PV in particular. Neither 






or businesses that had invested in energy generation for their own needs. At a national level, these 
systems, and all systems falling under 1MW of installed capacity were excluded from Cabinet 
deliberations on IPPs and were not considered relevant to the IRP 2010. This regulatory gap 
convinced NERSA to allow for the first pilot system to be installed in NMBM. 
 
CCT ED officials continued to work on developing the technical and financial models that would 
enable SSEG to be implemented locally. Officials agreed to a slow, phased approach. Any work 
had to conform to the both the MFMA and Electricity Regulation Act. The former stipulates that 
municipalities must avoid unnecessary regulatory losses and prohibits wasteful expenditure. The 
financial feasibility of SSEG was, therefore, critical to continued work in this area. Furthermore, 
because of limitation on the contracting terms to a maximum of three years, longer-term offtake 
agreements to purchase energy from embedded generators was not simple. Embedded generation 
is also subject to municipal bylaws. For CCT, the Electricity Supply By-law 2010, states: "No 
electricity generation equipment provided by a consumer in terms of any regulations or for his own 
requirements shall be connected to any installation without the prior written consent of the Director 
[of Electricity]" (Jones, 2016b). 
 
With no regulatory clarity forthcoming from NERSA, CCT and other municipalities made another 
appeal for clarity on SSEG in 2010. It was this engagement prompted NERSA to develop the 
Standard Conditions, which were published in 2011. Despite being inspired by municipalities; no 
consultations were held to ensure that the guidelines were clear and useful to local governments. 
The document prescribed a role for municipal governments in the administration and management 
for small-scale generation up to 100kW within municipal boundaries. The Standard Conditions only 
applied to the 75% of local distribution undertaken by the municipality within Cape Town. It 
proposed a system of Net Metering, in which small-scale generators are rewarded for the energy 
they feed into the municipal grid by discounting their energy bill (energy consumed minus energy 
exported to the grid). This arrangement assumes that small-scale generators are still net 
consumers of municipal energy, and not being paid out by the municipality. The Standard 
Conditions set out some technical requirements for metering (smart meters with bi-directional 
metering), reporting, and setting tariffs. It is important to note, however, that the legal status of this 
guideline document has never been clear. Different municipalities have interpreted the Standard 
Conditions idiosyncratically, resulting in variable policy approaches towards PV and local 
renewable energy opportunities (Jones, 2016a). Its implication, however, was that generator 
licences required under the Electricity Regulation Act, were not needed for systems under 100kW. 







As research to update the IRP commenced, it became clear that the cost of small-scale solar 
would reach parity with municipal electricity over time (City of Cape Town, 2014b). This is reflected 
in the IRP 2013’s inclusion of residential PV in national energy capacity planning (Republic of 
South Africa Department of Energy, 2013). At the same time, discussions were underway on how 
to make SSEG revenue-neutral for municipalities. CCT undertook internal cost evaluations to 
design a locally feasible tariff. This was subject to approval from City Council and NERSA. In 
parallel with this significant energy policy shift, a shift to low-carbon LED was also underway. In 
2013, the Western Cape Government and the City of Cape Town both committed to a green 
economy agenda, for low-carbon economic growth, and to explore opportunities for business and 
job development related to environmentally friendly, resource-efficient manufacturing and other 
activities (Western Cape Government, 2013). Economic opportunities related to a national 
renewable energy rollout through REIPPPP were prioritised. GreenCape, which had been 
established in 2010 to facilitate investment in green economic growth in the Western Cape, was 
expanded with a particular mandate to stimulate and support opportunities related to the 
renewable energy sector. 
 
This was an intense focus within the CCT in 2014, which turned out to be a critical year for 
progress on the City's SSEG work. The green economy provided a substantial economic and 
environmental policy frame for the ED team to continue to work to find a solution for SSEG. The 
rapidly evolving global technological context continued to inform CCT action. Brian Jones of CCT 
ED made a presentation to various Western Cape municipalities, as well as NERSA and Eskom 
representatives in 2014, at which he noted, "Grid connection of SSEG is happening! – It seems 
that PV will reach grid parity in 2015 (tomorrow)" (Centre for Renewable and Sustainable Energy 
Studies, 2014). The CCT recognised that energy planning needed to accommodate not only the 
present but also the future of energy generation, given decreasing costs and rapidly improving 
technology. Storage, for example, is a challenge for renewable energy from solar or wind power 
because they are intermittent (Centre for Renewable and Sustainable Energy Studies, 2014). 
However, as with the actual generation infrastructure, this is, as the ED team predicted, also 
significantly improving. 
 
CCT began to work within the Standard Conditions and was very active in municipal networks to 
share learning between 2012 and 2014. The ED team participated in workshops organised by 
AMEU, SALGA, Eskom officials and GIZ, to develop workable financial models for SSEG (SALGA, 






these municipalities developed a system in which "net consumers", customers that buy more 
municipal electricity than they generate in a year, could feasibly feed into the municipal grid. This 
was based on several local trials. In the CCT, the ED implement four pilots: one commercial pilot 
with no reverse power flow; and three residential pilots with reverse power flow. These pilots 
allowed the CCT to learn and develop a generalised approach to technology, especially the 
challenges of metering and payment for SSEG. While industrial and commercial customers could 
be relatively easily connected to the grid, without any clear guidance from NERSA, the 
municipalities were still left without a workable solution for connecting residential ‘prosumers'  
(Centre for Renewable and Sustainable Energy Studies, 2014).  
 
The CCT had been gradually migrating consumers to pre-paid meters to manage issues of non-
payment. Initially, this was not compatible with proposed metering solutions. However, to get buy-
in from the City Council, it had to be worked into the system (Jones, 2016a). The City started 
working with suppliers to develop a prepaid meter that could register reverse power flow and credit 
accounts automatically. Grid cost recovery was worked into daily service charges. The same 
metering system as used for commercial and industrial consumers was prescribed for residential 
consumers (City of Cape Town, 2014b). The standards for metering were developed before any 
formal national guidance was issued, and they were, therefore, subject to any specifications in 
updated national building codes. In the absence of this national standard, the City required a case 
by case assessment by a professional engineer in the interim. Municipalities were part of a multi-
party working ground with Eskom and industry representatives to address this gap. By May of 
2014, the municipalities reached a consensus on a net-metering system that could work, and this 
was distributed for comment to all local governments via circular Nb 14/2014. This concept was 
approved by the SALGA NEC in July of 2014 and submitted to NERSA.  Comments were also 
submitted, calling for an extension of the 100kW threshold in the Standard Conditions to 1MW.   
 
The local policy context continued to favour the ED team’s work on SSEG. CCT published The 
Low-Carbon City: Central City Strategy with the Cape Town Partnership and SEA in (City of Cape 
Town, 2014a). This strategy identified solar PV installation as an important component of the city's 
future sustainable development. In it, the City committed to developing general guidelines for 
installation and grid connection of small-scale systems by commercial and residential prosumers, 
providing detail on technology, tariffs, billing and other issues (City of Cape Town, Cape Town 
Partnership, & Sustainable Energy Africa, 2014). It also committed to supporting all national 
processes to enable SSEG. CCT recorded 550,000 residential consumers in 2014, of which 






of Cape Town, 2014b). Initial calculations suggested that based on an annual total electricity 
consumption of 11,000 gigawatt hours (GWh) 9 , 100,000 household installations (each 3kW, 
generating 350kWh per unit per month) would be able to generate 3.8% of total consumption. If 
these households also install solar water heaters, the electricity that they need to buy from the 
municipality would be minimal and priced at low consumption/low-income rates. 
 
Also in 2014, CCT reported that the increasing price of municipal (and Eskom's) electricity was 
driving increasing interest in small-scale generation (City of Cape Town, 2014b). The ED team was 
receiving almost daily enquiries as to how to connect private systems. Some illegal and dangerous 
grid connection were also identified. One PV supplier claimed to know of approximately 500 illegal 
grid-tied installations. In the same year, although a lack of established feed-in tariff was holding 
back demand, the CCT received ten serious applications from commercial consumers. 
 
CCT worked towards signing the first SSEG contract with the Black River Park on 23 September 
2014. This is a 1.2MW solar PV rooftop system, covering 14000m2. With NERSA’s approval, it 
feeds surplus energy into the municipal (City of Cape Town, 2014b). This system is not eligible for 
the city's tariff scheme because of its size. As motivation in its interactions with NERSA, it made 
use of the Electricity Regulation Act's "own use" exception, for electricity generation without a 
generation licence. To obtain NERSA's approval, the phased installation was registered as two 
separate energy projects so that each fell below the threshold of 1MW (Jones, 2016a). This was 
the first deal of this nature in the country. Following this, a similar 542kW system was installed on a 
Vodacom building. The ED team has maintained open communications on progress with NERSA 
throughout and has been supported by officials with the regulator during this process. 
 
Given the progress that had been made, CCT and other municipalities approached NERSA again 
in 2014. As pointed out in Section 4, NERSA was very responsive to the concerns of municipalities 
regarding the enduring confusion and lack of regulatory for SSEG. Municipalities were presented 
                                                 
 
 
9 GWh and Megawatt hour (MWh) are measures of energy used over a unit of time. In order to get to a certain amount of 
GWh for the year, a certain amount of installed capacity is required to generate that energy. Because this installed 
capacity does not operate at 100% efficiency, a measure must be applied to capture how efficient it is. This is required to 
ensure sufficient installed capacity to meet a target, as set out, for example in the IRP. If a 12MW wind farm produces an 
average of 6MW, then the capacity factor = 6 / 12 = 0.5 or 50%. Different technologies in different contexts can have 
vastly different capacity factors. The GWh or MWh generated in a year is equal to total installed capacity, multiplied by 
the capacity factor which is a measure of the efficiency of the technology being used, multiplied by the number of hours 
in a year. 1MW of solar capacity with a capacity factor of 25% will produce 1 x 0.25 X 8760 = 2190 MWh of electricity in 






with clear timelines for resolution by May in 2015. Unlike the Standard Conditions, the draft Small-
Scale Regulations were based on very extensive consultation with municipalities like CCT, which 
had all been taking related but nuanced approached to SSEG. CCT delivered detailed comments 
to the draft published by NERSA in February of 2015 (Jones, 2016a). As it became increasingly 
unclear when the formal regulations would be published, CCT continued to work with GreenCape 
on local SSEG implementation and has shared its technical expertise, through GreenCape, with 
other less well-capacitated municipalities. CCT is also working through SALGA and the National 
Treasury City Support Unity to accommodate medium and long-term impacts on municipal revenue 
models. When it became apparent that the DoE had scuppered NERSA's process, and then later 
that the Minister was pushing for nuclear energy expansion, CCT continued to work to enable 
SSEG. 
 
The City has learned from its own experimentation and lessons from other municipalities and is 
now allowing grid connection up to 1 MW without a generation license. It has undertaken to report 
all SSEG to NERSA in line with the Standard Conditions. There is the possibility that NERSA will 
override the City's procedures at some point with new regulations, and all private investors carry 
this risk. Despite this, in March 2016, the City published Safe and Legal Installations of Rooftop 
Photovoltaic Systems: Commercial and Residential in Cape Town (City of Cape Town, 2016). 
There are now guidelines and standards for rooftop PV installations, along with a process map for 
grid connection, outlining the approvals required from various municipal departments. Successful 
applicants are issued a letter of consent. Metering standards and a special tariff have been put in 
place. CCT now has more than 170 legal SSEG grid connections (and still more illegal 
connections). The City is also working with GreenCape to develop PV solutions for low-income 
households (Janisch, 2016). 
 
CCT processes still do not apply to Eskom-supplied consumers within the municipal boundary. 
Even off-grid installations may require Eskom’s approval before operation, but this is unclear. The 
Standard Conditions may have created a formal mandate for municipalities to work in this space, 
but CCT has worked slowly and consistently over the past eight years to convert that mandate to 
an implementable local policy.  
3.5.2 Knowledge Transfer and Regulatory Development in the Western Cape 
CCT’s work has been supported by WCG, both politically and with research. Other municipalities, 
being less well capacitated than the metro, have followed its lead. Together, Western Cape 
municipalities identified the following challenges for localised renewable energy generation in 2014 






• Procurement processes, especially the MFMA, but also Provincial Treasury’s regulations; 
• The municipal revenue model; 
• A lack of regulatory clarity about tariffs, technical standards, metering, and acceptable 
investments in energy generated by municipalities for municipal use; 
• Acceptable models for local (municipal and private) offtake directly from IPPs (not through 
Eskom).  
• Impacts on service delivery and equity resulting from an increasing share of privatised 
energy generation. 
In March 2015, WCG and the CCT convened municipalities, industry specialists and business 
representatives to formulate a coherent provincial strategy to ensure local energy security. The 
opportunities and challenges of SSEG featured prominently. This meeting led to an 
intergovernmental programme, the Energy Game Changer, "[to] minimise the impact of power 
shortages and load shedding on the economy and employment over the next five years," for a 
lower carbon, more efficient, future (Western Cape Government, 2015a). At its inception, it 
targeted a 20% reduction in consumption of electricity generated from coal within the province. 
Building on the work of CCT, support for SSEG was one of the primary mechanisms identified to 
achieve this goal. The Game Changer has mobilised high-level political support for SSEG, but its 
ambitions have been somewhat tempered, targeting only a 10% reduction in grid energy 
consumption after its public launch early in 2016. 
 
The metro, district and local municipalities in the province are working with GreenCape, a non-
profit, special purpose vehicle (SPV) established by WCG to support resource-efficient economic 
development in the province. GreenCape secures most of its finance from WCG, reporting to the 
Department of Economic Development and Tourism (DEDAT), also working closely with CCT on 
specific projects. Building on the CCT’s work over several years, the SPV has developed a generic 
set of draft guidelines to enable solar PV at a municipal level (GreenCape, 2016a, 2016b). These 
draft regulations are in line with the Standard Conditions and all relevant national regulations and 
local government bylaws. GreenCape has worked closely with self-selecting municipalities to tailor 
these guidelines to the local context. According to GreenCape, 13 Western Cape Municipalities 
(listed below) have now developed local regulations to allow small-scale embedded energy.  
 
Table 4: Western Cape Municipalities that allow embedded energy, Source: GreenCape, 2016 
Municipality  Allow small-scale 
embedded energy 
Tariffs in place Policies in place 






Bergrivier Yes Yes In progress 
City of Cape Town Yes Yes Yes 
Drakenstein  Yes Yes Yes 
George Yes Yes Yes 
Mossel Bay Yes Yes Yes 
Oudtshoorn Yes In progress In progress 
Overstrand Yes Yes In progress 
Stellenbosch  Yes Yes Yes 
Swartland Yes Yes Yes 
Theewaterskloof Yes Yes Yes 
Langberg Yes In progress Yes 
Breed Valley Yes In progress No 
 
This level of policy development is indicative of significant progress from the three municipalities 
that had clear standards and procedures in 2014 (SAMSET, 2014). The guidelines, as in CCT, 
allow for generation up to 1MW (not 100kW/0.1MW as in the Standard Conditions) (GreenCape, 
2016b). The guidelines are also in line with Eskom's technical specifications to ensure compatibility 
with the grid. Despite the local policy frameworks, actual implementation remains relatively slow. 
While the CCT case study shows that progress has been made in negotiating some of the barriers 
to SSEG, the issues of revenue management and equitable access to energy services are by no 
means resolved. 
3.5.3 Case 2: Utility Scale Ambitions in Drakenstein Municipality 
The case of ‘waste to energy' (WTE) infrastructure in Drakenstein is an example of a municipality 
working within an existing municipal mandate to develop an opportunity for localised energy 
generation. Unlike other energy projects, municipalities have an uncontroversial waste 
management mandate that legitimises these investments. At the same time, most provinces have 
significant challenges regarding long-terms strategy for dealing with waste in a sustainable, legal, 
financially viable and locally beneficial way. Landfills are quickly reaching capacity, and because of 
their undesirable environmental impacts, are being supplemented with other waste management 
strategies, including generating energy through a growing menu of technological processes (CSIR, 
2011).  
 
As with SSEG, WTE is subject to complex financial management and procurement regulations. 
The Drakenstein WTE has not yet been built; however, the case is included here because the 
municipality has managed to successfully navigate the procurement processes that many local 
governments see as a significant barrier to investment in energy infrastructure (Technical 






investigated by WCG to extract key lessons for replicability, either directly for WTE, or for other 
sustainable energy procurement. It is also selected because the planned scale of energy 
generation is unprecedented.  
 
The WTE plant will have an energy generation capacity of approximately 12.6 megawatts (MW) 
(USTDA, 2016). Outside of the Western Cape, WTE projects have been implemented in 
Ekurhuleni (1MW) and Ethekwini (7.5MW). The respective municipal governments generated both 
projects, and both plants feed electricity into the local grid to be distributed as normal (AMEU et al., 
2016). The City of Johannesburg also has a biogas to energy facility (1.1MW); however, electricity 
generated is consumed onsite. No WTE initiative has successfully been implemented in the 
Western Cape.  
 
Drakenstein Municipality first formally began to investigate WTE in 2008.  Aligned to the 
sustainable development focus of the provincial administration, there was an increasing interest in 
extracting local economic value and creating jobs in waste processing (Western Cape Government 
Department of Environmental Affairs and Development Planning, 2014). At the time, Drakenstein 
was faced with an immediate problem. The municipality has a single landfill site in Wellington, 
which also services the other towns within the municipal boundary, Hermon, Gouda, Paarl, and 
Saron (Western Cape Government, 2015b). In 2008, it was anticipated that this landfill site would 
need to be decommissioned by 2012. It was seen as a matter of urgency to find an affordable 
solution. At the same time, the municipality was concerned about local impacts of Eskom’s load 
shedding and price increases, which had commenced in the same year.  
 
WTE addressed both problems at once. According to municipal officials, the project was 
successfully motivated because it will enable the municipality to keep waste tariffs at an affordable 
level. WTE is predicted to have a positive long-term impact on local electricity tariffs, by adding to 
the available local energy supply(Louw, 2016). Keeping service delivery affordable is a key 
concern for Drakenstein and many other local governments. Additionally, the operation of the 
project is seen as an LED opportunity to support job creation by unlocking value from waste. Jobs 
will be generated within the facility itself, with 116 permanent jobs expected (Drakenstein 
Municipality, 2015). There are further opportunities for job creation in the processing of by-products. 
 
Drakenstein, in 2008 and to date, manages all waste (Solid Waste Services) internally. It was 
quickly recognised, however, that the design, construction and operation of a WTE facility, required 






relationship with a service provider would be necessary to develop a suitable, sustainable solution 
(Louw, 2016). The scope of service would cover the finance, design, construction, management, 
operation and maintenance of a WTE plant, as well as operation of the municipality's waste 
treatment and disposal services. The establishment of the project had to be structured as a PPP to 
allow for an adequate contracting period between the municipality and the service provider 
(Republic of South Africa, 2004). Many municipal activities for sustainability and resource (e.g. 
renewable energy generation and ecosystems management) have an investment payback periods 
that are longer than three years (Technical Assistance Unit and Western Cape Government, 
2014). This is the time threshold beyond which a PPP is mandatory. A complicated and lengthy 
process is prescribed to establish this kind of agreement. 
 
The procurement process began in 2008 with a Request for Proposals (RFP) for “The 
Development of a Waste to Energy Project at Drakenstein Municipality” for “a medium to long term 
Public Private Partnership with a preferred bidder in the planning, designing, financing, 
construction and operation of a Waste to Energy Project” (Jan Palm Consulting Engineers, 2008). 
The detail of the technical solution was left to the service provider to specify. The preferred bidder 
was chosen on the basis of having the strongest technical solution. The municipality reports that 
legislation technically requires that the idea is put through viability testing before a preferred bidder 
is selected. However, a deviation from this process was allowed because it was recognised that 
the design needed to be developed in partnership with the municipality, rather than choosing from 
a list of fully predetermined infrastructure choices (Louw, 2016).  
 
Because waste management is defined as a municipal service10, a PPP requires compliance with 
the MFMA, Municipal Public-Private Partnership Regulations, 2005, and the Municipal Systems 
Act (specifically Chapter 8, Sections 76-78) (Technical Assistance Unit and Western Cape 
Government, 2014). This entails the following process:  
1. A review of current services as administered by the municipality (including a cost-benefit 
analysis, a municipal capacity assessment, administrative impact assessment, a 
community impact assessment, and a review of national and international trends relevant to 
the service area) 
2. A process to consider external service provision, leading to formal council approval 
                                                 
 
 
10, A different process applies if the activity under the partnership falls within a municipality's legal competence, but does 
not constitute a municipal service. An example would be partnering with a service provider to have solar water heaters 






3. A feasibility study 
4. A competitive bidding process 
The PPP also required consultation and approval by WCG and National Treasury, in advance of 
seeking the approval of the Municipal Council. WCG has been supportive of the project. 
Drakenstein worked with National Treasury's PPP Unit, to structure a deal that is an effective and 
affordable service delivery mechanism. The process followed by Drakenstein is summarised in the 
table, below. 
 
Table 5: Key milestones in the PPP process. Source Drakenstein Municipality, 2015 
Date Milestone 
2008 RFP issued 
2011 Bid Adjudication Committee established 
2011 Treasury approval 
2012 Memorandum of Agreement in place 
2012 Drakenstein Waste to Energy Section 78-1 Assessment Report Draft issued 
2013 Treasury Views and Recommendations (TVR1) letter issued 
2013 Feasibility Study Report issued 
2013 Final Consolidated Report on Comments received 
2014 Council decision in terms of Section 78(4) (23 April 2014) 
2014 Interwaste appointed (Appointment Letter issued) 
2014 Draft Scoping Report 
2015 Final Scoping Report released 
 
In 2011, there was a change in political leadership, following a local government election. This 
change delayed the project, as municipal officials had to secure approval from a new local council 
that was not immediately in support of the project (Louw, 2016). Only once this was secure, could 
officials proceed to draw up a Memorandum of Agreement with Interwaste, the successful bidder. 
To manage the complexity of a comprehensive waste management solution with a large WTE 
component, Interwaste established a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), that has drawn together all 
the necessary knowledge, skills and capacity to implement required activities under a ‘joint 
venture'. The SPV will manage the facility, which will include the following components: 
• Wellington Material Recovery Facility (“MRF”) – handling clean or dirty waste 
• Municipal Solid Waste (MSW) Pressing Plant (“VMpress”) 
• Anaerobic Digestion (“AD”) Plant 
• Direct Combustion (“DC”) Plant. 
To realise this project, the PPP agreement with Interwaste contains several detailed schedules, 






waste treatment and disposal services; a project site land lease; the build, ownership, operation 
and transfer of project components; and an energy power purchase agreement. The PPP will last 
for 20 years to allow adequate time for cost recovery (Louw, 2016). While the agreement is drawn 
up, it still depends on the successful obtainment of the following approvals: 
 
Table 6: Environmental Permissions Required. Source: Drakenstein Municipality, 2015 
Requirement Authority 
Environmental Authorisation (through a Scoping 
and Environmental Impact Assessment (SEIA)  
Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) 
Waste Management Licence Western Cape Government Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Development Planning 
(DEADP) 
Atmospheric Emissions License Cape Winelands District Municipality 
Electricity Generation Licence (if pursued) NERSA 
Water Use Licence (not confirmed) Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS) 
 
The SEIA process has been complicated. By law, it has included extensive public consultation, 
which commenced in August 2014 (Drakenstein Municipality, 2015). Public participation was not 
easy. Initially, municipal officials struggled to elicit any substantive input from the public. Despite 
this initial lack of interest, members of the local community did eventually respond by forming the 
Drakenstein Environmental Watch (DEW), a registered non-profit organisation, to oppose aspects 
of the project. DEW was specifically concerned about the use of a private contractor to deliver a 
municipal service: "this hazardous activity will in future be in the hands of an outside company 
intent on maximising its profits" (Drakenstein Municipality, 2015). The result was that the final 
stages of the SEIA have been counterproductive and have further delayed the project.  
 
Despite all hurdles, municipal officials and political leaders have remained committed to seeing the 
project through. The financial benefit will be significant. The municipality undertook ‘value for 
money' assessment the project, which contrasted a WTE PPP with conventional landfilling. For the 
20-year lifespan of the project, it is anticipated that the municipality will save R632,118,612 
(Drakenstein Municipality, 2015). To finance a new landfill or make use of facilities within CCT, 
consumer waste tariff increases of 41,3% and 30.5% would need to be implemented in the two 
years after the closure of the current site (Drakenstein Municipality, 2015). With the WTE solution, 
tariffs will only increase at an average rate of 9% per year. It is anticipated that the WTE will extend 
the lifespan of the current Wellington Landfill to 2035, by reducing landfilled waste by 52%, and 







MBHE African Power (Pty) Ltd is managing the energy component of the project. In 2016, MBHE 
was awarded grant funding from the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) to finance its 
work (USTDA, 2016). This grant is part of the USTDA’s work to enable 30,000 MW of renewable 
energy capacity in Sub-Saharan Africa. The WTE facility, because it will not technically be a small-
scale power plant (under 5MW), is potentially subject to more complex licensing procedures than 
the SSEG in CCT. As things stand, however, the municipality plans to use all the energy generated 
for ‘own use' (street lights, waste water treatment works, administrative buildings, etc.), thereby 
possibly circumventing the requirement for a generation license over the short-term (Louw, 2016). 
This is because, according to municipal officials, the plant will not initially have the full 12.6MW of 
generation capacity available. The lag buys some time to structure an appropriate arrangement 
with NERSA to register as an IPP and seek a generation license under the Electricity Regulation 
Act (Louw, 2016; Republic of South Africa, 2006; Republic of South Africa Department of Energy, 
2015). 
3.6 Where do Municipalities Stand within the Current State of Play? 
It is clear that for municipalities, both money and political power are at stake in the energy sector.  
Despite the difficulty of depending on Eskom's energy tariffs and internal management issues, the 
current municipal revenue model offers municipalities a degree of autonomy from national revenue 
collection and distribution, as well as a direct mechanism to respond to non-payment (cutting off 
supply). This autonomy goes towards explaining the determination of municipalities to preserve 
and transform their role in the energy sector. What is clear is that none of the existing policies and 
regulations anticipated how new technological options allowing for small and micro-scale electricity 
generation would shape and augment the role of local governments within energy sectors, 
internationally, and certainly not how they could do so in South Africa. 
 
The CCT's slow and steady progress in terms of SSEG regulations and implementation 
development have been critical to the localisation of a small but significant proportion of electricity 
generation. A combination of local experimentation, lateral engagement with other municipalities 
and technical advisory bodies, and lobbying NERSA have resulted in unprecedented small-scale 
private renewable energy infrastructure development. The trajectory from the first legal non-pilot 
installation late in 2014 to more than 170 installations in 2016 is limited by local capacity 
constraints, as well as the uncertain national policy context (Jones, 2016a). Despite actions carried 
out within the province, these issues remain unclear, and the sustainability of work undertaken so 
far is still vulnerable to backtracking of NERSA's ad hoc support, as well as high-level licensing 







Drakenstein's WTE plant is being implemented in the same unclear regulatory space as small-
scale SSEG. While waste management is a clear municipal mandate, the planned WTE 
component of the municipality's solution will exceed the capacity of any existing municipal WTE 
infrastructure. The fact that the project is being pushed through, in advance of a clear electricity 
generation licensing plan seems to indicate a high level of confidence that the regulatory space for 
the plant to operate will be successfully navigated. While this project has not led to any new 
regulations, it has modelled how to, and how not to, navigate the complexities of financial and 
procurement regulations applicable to energy infrastructure. It has also succeeded in drawing 
international donor funds into a municipal level energy project. WCG is disseminating lessons from 
this process to other local governments. NMBM in the Eastern Cape is currently adjudicating bids 
for a similar project and opportunities for two other plants in the Western Cape are being 
considered (Mkosana, 2016).  
 
On 16 December 2015, NERSA announced that its process to produce clear regulations for 
localised, embedded renewable energy generation was officially delayed by the DoE’s newly 
initiated comprehensive review of licencing requirements for all energy generation. Because this 
framework will determine the parameters of the Small-Scale Regulations, they cannot be released 
until the DoE’s process is complete. No timeline for completion has been provided (NERSA, 
2015a). It was shortly after NERSA's announcement that the conflict between the municipalisation 
of a broader range of energy mandates and national priorities became clear. A ministerial 
determination for nuclear energy was published, immediately sparking vehement opposition from 
academia, civil society and from within government, from vocal municipalities and opposition 
parties in parliament  (Eberhard, 2016; Ensor, 2016; Republic of South Africa Department of 
Minerals and Energy, 2015).  
3.7 Concluding comments 
The regulatory space for municipal facilitation of SSEG, as well as direct investment in small-scale 
renewable energy, remains unclear. Tracing the evolving role of municipal governments in the 
energy sector, and specifically in the Western Cape, has shown how this lack of clarity has 
maintained a space for municipal action to promote, enable, facilitate and invest in decentralised 
renewables. Reacting to the inadequacy of these existing policy and legal frameworks, seemingly 
ad hoc efforts undertaken by individual municipalities have exploited regulatory gaps to expand 
direct and indirect control of localised renewable energy. Rather than waiting for top-down 
instructions, a few entrepreneurial municipalities, of which CCT has played a leading role have 
been redefining the range of possible actions, as well as local regulatory frameworks, from the 






space and a precarious yet hitherto effective regulatory framework for further expansion of 
municipal power in this area. While this has allowed for some significant progress, it remains 
uncertain, vulnerable to dismantling under the DoE's new licencing conditions. 
 
Nevertheless, the story does not end here, and municipal efforts continue. The fact that more 
municipalities are now following the same approach, and that they are working together through 
SALGA provides the best security against any pressure from actors within national government or 
Eskom to squash decentralised renewables. The extent of investment, all legal and sanctioned by 
NERSA, cannot be quickly scuppered without resulting in significant wasteful expenditure. This 
collective action, as well as framing SSEG and other decentralised renewables as a shared 
financial imperative presents a viable alternative to large Eskom-dominated investments in nuclear 
or more coal-fired power. What can be done now is to take stock of, group, and consolidate ad hoc 
actions – investments and regulations – so that they can be viewed as a coherent policy alternative 
to the thin Draft IRP 2016. Further support is also required for those smaller and less well-
capacitated municipalities, to ensure that they are a part of this transition, and not left shouldering 
the burden of an increasingly indebted Eskom. 
 
Municipalities have a body of evidence, through their implemented initiatives, to show that SSEG 
can work in South Africa. They also have the support of small and large businesses that have and 
plan to invest in SSEG. Together, municipalities and businesses can make a clear case to enable 
decentralised renewable energy in South Africa, and to remove uncertainty by clarifying the 
national policy and regulatory framework for this work. The success of these efforts depends on 
their interaction with entrenched interest networks in a highly centralised national energy sector. 








4 Building an Alternative to South Africa’s Nuclear Future, 
from the Ground up  
4.1 Introduction 
Between the significant expansion of nuclear power and renewable energy, respectively, South 
Africa is faced with two distinct strategies for the decarbonisation of its energy sector. While on the 
surface, they are not necessarily entirely mutually exclusive, they are in tension with one another. 
Chapter 3 argued that what looked like ad hoc, bottom-up municipal actions to promote localised 
renewable energy amount to an unexpected and still precarious expansion of the role of local 
governments in South Africa's energy sector. By examining the full spectrum of undertakings, as 
they grew in scope and ambition between 2008 and 2016, what becomes visible is a new force 
driving the country towards greater decentralisation of energy generation, planning and 
management. This chapter contextualises pertinent municipal actions to facilitate and invest in 
localised renewable energy from Chapter 3, within the broader policy shifts and investment 
decisions made during the same period, from 2008 to 2016. The aim of this contextualisation is to 
surface contrapuntal political and economic interests shaping the country's energy landscape in 
very different ways. 
 
Municipally driven decentralisation provides a potentially complementary strategy to REIPPPP, 
which, while introducing some private ownership of energy generation, remains a highly 
centralised programme. While this is one possibility, it is also entirely possible that an expanded 
REIPPPP could function to the exclusion of greater municipalisation of the energy sector. For this 
reason, the expansion of REIPPPP is represented as Strategy 1 (S1), and REIPPPP plus 







Figure 5: Tension between REIPPPP, municipalisation and nuclear procurement 
What is clear, is that a large scale nuclear procurement programme (S3) runs contrary to 
REIPPPP (S1) and decentralised renewable energy (S2). A conflict arises because of the 
investment timescale (lasting several decades), and massive physical scale of infrastructure for 
nuclear power, is opposed to the diversity of technology and financial and ownership models for 
renewable energy, discussed in Chapter 2. What should be noted is that only S3, REIPPPP, is 
currently sanctioned in official national energy policy. Nuclear expansion remains in contradiction 
of the latest valid IRP, and municipalisation falls into a regulatory grey area. 
 
What this chapter will illustrate, is how, despite rounds of white papers and integrated planning 
processes creating a formal and gradually expanded policy commitment to renewable energy 
generation at all scales from 1998 to 2008, the implementation of and preferred pathway for 
decarbonisation in South Africa remained highly contested throughout. Moving forward, distinct 
interest networks pushed for a nuclear expansion, first in parallel with renewable energy, then at its 
alternative, cloaked in a paper-thin discourse of national economic development. It will be argued, 
using process tracing, that between 2008 and 2014 the nuclear expansion lobby has been fortified 
by a nexus of financial interests that are embroiled with alleged networks of state capture. More 
critically, however, the particular events that followed between 2014 and 2016 point to the 
possibility of dislodging these nuclear interest networks, from the bottom-up. S3 can, therefore, be 
seen as a strategy to engage with renewable energy with a renewed, adequate response to the 







4.2  Attempts to Introduce Renewables and Decentralisation: 1998-2008 
As local energy distributors, municipal governments are embedded in a complex and often 
immutable set of institutional arrangements in the South African energy sector. Inherited by the 
ANC-led democratic government in 1994, it is composed of a highly centralised, dense 
configuration of actors and interests, which under apartheid was obscured by cloistered and 
opaque decision-making logics and processes. Ownership of energy related assets lay with 
Eskom, a state-owned monopoly that controlled every aspect of energy security, from generation 
to transmission, distribution and sale, all resistant to transparent governance processes (Public 
Affairs Research Institute, 2013).  
 
In 1998, an ambitious technocratic policy reform was proposed in the White Paper on Energy, 
prescribing ‘good practice' solutions to untangle this political thicket and steer the country towards 
a modern sustainable energy system  (Republic of South Africa Department of Minerals and 
Energy, 1998). For the purposes of this analysis, it is important to emphasise that the White Paper 
formally introduced decarbonisation11and aspects of decentralisation regarding generation only. It 
proposed separating transmission, distribution and generation functions. For the latter, it proposed 
introducing competition for the first time in the sector, prescribing the sale of some of Eskom's core 
assets (Republic of South Africa Department of Minerals and Energy, 1998). 
 
It also proposed clear and transparent energy policy planning, which would be overseen by 
Cabinet and led by the governing department, then the Department of Minerals and Energy (DME). 
Transparent planning was antidote its observation that a "feature of the energy sector during the 
apartheid period was excessive secrecy, which made rational and public debate on energy policy 
nigh impossible" (Republic of South Africa Department of Minerals and Energy, 1998). The energy 
outlook and strategy for the country would explicitly support sustainable development goals for the 
young democracy. This White Paper provided a clear logic and imperative to fix inefficiencies in 
the system, to look to international 'good practice' for new models, and to find an alternative to the 
apartheid relic of Eskom's monopoly by introducing elements of competition and diversity of energy 
sources. While it proposed private sector involvement as well as renewables, it did not see the 
                                                 
 
 
11 It notes: “South Africa is responsible for 1,6% of global greenhouse gas emissions and the country’s energy sector is 
the single largest source of greenhouse gas emissions in Africa, being dependent on coal for more than 75% of the 






municipalities as an integral part of the transition to this new, lower-carbon, configuration of 
infrastructure and actors. 
 
From 1999, the DME, the national energy regulator (NER) and Eskom, did undertake various 
actions to implement various aspects of the White Paper, while publically denouncing its economic 
rationale (Public Affairs Research Institute, 2013). As these measures were unfolding, in the early 
2000s, it was clear that the cheap and plentiful coal-fired energy provided almost exclusively by 
Eskom over the past three decades would not be adequate to meet the country's future growing 
demand (Public Affairs Research Institute, 2013). As plans to address a looming crisis were 
formulated, Eskom's prices began to increase sharply (Lucy Baker et al., 2015).  It was in this 
context that the country's first multi-stakeholder National Integrated Resource Plan (NIRP) process 
was carried out between 2001 to 2002 by the NER. This plan provided a planning and investment 
roadmap, stating how much energy was needed, of what kind and by whom it would be generated. 
Under the DME's oversight, in 2003 a second white paper, the Renewable Energy White Paper, 
was approved by Cabinet (Eberhard et al., 2014). This second white paper gave more policy 
weight to the push for renewables by setting a target for the construction of 10,000GWh of 
renewable energy generation capacity by 2013 (Republic of South Africa Department of Minerals 
and Energy, 2003b). 
 
The technocratic reforms proposed in both white papers did not anticipate the breadth and 
complexity of the challenge at hand, of coordinating the various efforts such varied stakeholders, 
including Eskom and the municipalities. As covered in Chapter 3, the municipalities successfully 
resisted the 1998 White Paper's electricity distribution industry (EDI) reform, until these efforts 
were finally abandoned in 2010. Still in 2003, the vigour of the 1998 White Paper plans to unbundle 
Eskom were tempered, with the state-owned company (SOC) claiming that this would undermine 
its financial viability (Public Affairs Research Institute, 2013). Organised labour also supported 
Eskom's continued monopoly, as these stakeholders believed privatisation would prompt 
escalating consumer prices. In response to pockets of resistance, different sets of reforms were 
reformulated in an attempt to make them more workable. Regarding private generation, a new plan 
targeted a 30% energy contribution from IPPs, representing a significant increase from only 6% of 
non-Eskom energy that was then in the mix. As the energy security outlook of the country 
worsened, rather than move forward with the establishment IPPs, in 2006, the DME and Energy 
granted Eskom a license to build Medupi, the first new coal-fired power station in more than two 







In the same year, the NERSA began operating, absorbing the NER. NERSA had been established 
in terms of Section 3 of the National Energy Regulator Act, 2004 (Act No. 40 of 2004). NERSA 
takes its framework from the Electricity Regulation Act, 2006 (No. 4 of 2006), as amended by Act 
28 of 2007, which sets out the parameters for determining the terms of electricity licensing and 
registration, generation, and distribution. It also oversees the following: energy pricing and tariffs; 
energy infrastructure; and any other regulatory reform. NERSA's mandates are critical to the 
municipal narrative because NERSA has been able to use its authority to enable the actions 
covered in Chapter 3 because of the scope of its mandate, for which it does not need to defer to 
the Department of Energy (DoE). 
 
Another critical development during this time was the legal mechanism to procure privately owned 
renewable energy capacity. In terms of Section 34 (1) of the Electricity Regulation Act, the Minister 
of Energy, technically in consultation with NERSA, is empowered to make determinations for the 
procurement of new generation capacity. The Act also allows for the establishment of IPPs for the 
purpose of greater competition in electricity generation12. Further, these Ministerial Determinations 
may also make other specifications, in line with the Electricity Regulations on New Generation 
Capacity (published as GNR. 399 in Government Gazette No. 34262 dated 4 May 2011, as 
amended on 19 May 2015) (New Gen Regulations). Specifications include specifying the buyer 
(Eskom or other), and the procurement mechanism, for example, a bidding process for any new 
energy capacity (Republic of South Africa Department of Energy, 2015).  
 
By 2007, the ageing and ailing infrastructure supplying electricity South Africa's growing economy 
failed to cope with demand. Eskom implemented controlled, localised blackouts termed "load 
shedding" to relieve stress on the national energy supply and grid infrastructure, and so avoid 
nationwide shutdowns. Despite the lights going out, as time passed, little was done to come close 
to reaching Renewable Energy White Paper target (Eberhard et al., 2014). Another renewable 
energy policy, Free Basic Alternative Energy Policy, for the delivery of renewable energy to low-
income households, was added to the National Electrification Programme and Free Basic 
Electricity Policy (Department of Minerals and Energy, 2007). It was intended for municipalities to 
drive implementation. In terms of actual investments, however, in the midst of continued rolling 
blackouts, in 2008 procurement also commenced for Kusile, another coal-fired power station, also 
                                                 
 
 
12 Ministerial Determinations are informed by the Electricity Regulations on New Generation Capacity (published 2011 






4,800MW in capacity. Both facilities flew in the face of environmental commitments undertaken by 
the national government, to reduce the carbon intensity of South Africa's economy, and address 
issues like acid rain (Rafey & Sovacool, 2011). 
 
The cumulative result of the massive energy investments during this period was that the country's 
energy sector remained highly centralised in both the governance and procurement of energy and 
regarding generation and infrastructure management, with Eskom still a dominant power. This bold 
attempt at policy reform failed to be implemented, but the ideas it concretised, of decarbonisation 
and diluting Eskom's power, have been as enduring as contrapuntal movements against them. 
4.3 Key role players and relationships for and against decentralisation 
Globally and in South Africa, it is a high stakes game with significant financial resources changing 
hands. By 2009, South Africa’s electricity market reached a record USD5.6 billion (Msimanga & 
Sebitosi, 2014). The Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme 
(REIPPPP) has generated a further R192 billion in investment, as of June 2015 (GreenCape, 
2016d). It is not surprising that such significant investments have attracted powerful interest 
networks backing coal or renewables, respectively, and more recently, new nuclear capacity. 
There is tremendous potential for rent-seeking in the procurement of any of these energy sources 
that needs to be addressed in the design of procurement, as government opens and closes 
opportunities to invest with significant returns (Schmitz, Johnson, & Altenburg, 2015).   
 
Determining this landscape, by controlling the scale and mechanism for energy procurement, are 
the Ministry of Energy, the Department of Energy13, and Cabinet. Recent nuclear procurement 
plans reinforce the highly centralised configuration of the energy sector, also presenting rent-
seeking opportunities on a scale that outstrips REIPPPP. The most commonly applied assessment 
for the construction costs for eight nuclear reactors with 9,600MW peak capacity stands (very 
conservatively) at USD40 billion to USD50 billion over six years (Yelland, 2016a).  
 
The table below summarises the actors and actions in support of nuclear (S3), REIPPPP (S2), and 
greater municipalisation (S3). The ambivalence of some of these actors is also reflected. It is 
critical to note that coalitions within these organisations have also displayed contradistinct roles. 
 
                                                 
 
 
13 The Department of Minerals and Energy was split in 2009, with the energy mandate falling to the Department of 






Table 7: Stakeholders for and against decentralisation 






S3: Driving a 9,600 MW 
nuclear procurement deal, 
contradicting formal energy 
policy 
• 2011: Enabled REIPPPP through ministerial determinations for 
renewables 
• 2013: Undertook nuclear procurement planning 
• 2015: Issued determinations for both nuclear and renewable 
energy capacity 
• 2015: Established a national nuclear procurement programme 
• 2015: Redrafted nuclear determination to appoint Eskom as 
procurement agent 
DoE S3: The latest IRP has 
rolled back support for 
renewable energy, leaving a 
gap for a case to be made 
for nuclear 
• 2010: Released a national IRP calling for renewables and nuclear 
• 2013: Released an updated IRP calling for decentralised energy, 
and delaying nuclear 
• 2015: Delayed NERSA’s Small-Scale Relations, pending higher-
level licensing reform 
• 2016: Developed a widely-criticised IRP that accommodates 
nuclear energy 
Eskom S3: Obstructing REIPPPP 
processes, leading 
procurement for nuclear 
• 2015: Signed up as nuclear procurement agent (rather than DoE) 
• 2016: Chairman / CEO both state the SOC’s position to oppose the 
connection of future REIPPPP projects to the national transmission 
grid 
• 2015-2016: Public support for nuclear in parliament and media  
Cabinet/War 
Room 
S3: Supporting an Eskom-
centred approach to energy 
security, no public position 
on decentralised energy 
• 2009: Zuma commits South Africa to voluntary carbon emissions 
reductions 
• 2014: Established War Room in response to Eskom’s governance 
challenges, and the national energy crisis  
• 2014: Approved nuclear procurement deal  
• 2016: President announced support for nuclear on the condition of 
affordability 
• 2016: Nuclear procurement announced in Budget Speech 
REIPPPP 
Office 
S1, no public position on 
S2: Driven a successful 
renewable energy 
procurement programme  
• 2011-2016: Successful implementation of REIPPPP in partnership 
with Treasury 
Treasury S1, some support for S2: 
PPP unit in support of 
REIPPPP 
• 2011: Established REIPPPP programme through PPP unit 
• 2014-2016: City Support Programme worked with municipalities to 
address financial sustainability risks of decentralised energy 
NERSA Supportive of S1 and S2: 
The regulator has played a 
cautious role that has 
• 2008-2016: Assisted municipalities on SSEG 






validated municipal efforts 
under S2 
• 2011: Issued first SSEG regulations – Standard Conditions up to 
100kW 
• 2013: Issued a renewable energy trading license to PowerX 
• 2014: Issued first SSEG licenses up to 1MW in CCT 
• 2015: Issued draft Small-Scale Regulations in 2015 
Municipalities 
(and SALGA) 
S2: Driving localised energy 
generation and 
management 
• 2008: Began to engage NERSA  
• 2010: Piloted SSEG in NMBM 
• 2011-2016: Initiated various SSEG projects (see Chapter 3) 
• 2011-2016: Enabled other renewable energy investments and 
wheeling agreements (See Chapter 3) 
• 2012-2014: SALGA played an active knowledge-sharing role 




S1, and S2: Interest in 
securing current 
investments and expanding 
opportunities 
• 2013: PowerX obtained a renewable energy trading license, 
engaging directly with energy consumers instead of Eskom 
• Several IPPs have communicated interest in working with 
municipalities 
 
4.4 Process Tracing: Renewables Gain Ground 2008-2014 
This section applies the process tracing methodology to surface tension between the promotion of 
nuclear procurement and both REIPPPP and municipalisation of renewable energy. This narrative 
draws on interviews, formal documents, and newspaper articles. By covering events between 2008 
and 2016, it will show how nuclear procurement has sidelined local governments, national energy 
security policy and planning, and renewable energy of all scales. It will also illustrate how the 
municipal activities covered in Chapter 3 are opening a pathway around this nuclear mire. 
4.4.1 President Zuma Promotes Decarbonisation 
2008 was characterised by energy insecurity and continuing steep electricity tariff increases. It also 
saw the beginning of municipal engagement with NERSA on the possibility, potential and 
management of SSEG. In 2009 President Jacob Zuma committed the country to reduce 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 34% by 2020 and 42% by 2025 (Lucy Baker et al., 2015). 
Because 45% of these emissions are attributed to the energy sector, this committed represented a 
further policy push towards decarbonisation, even as Medupi and Kusile were developing. The 
options for decarbonisation were renewable energy (solar, wind, hydro, waste to energy) and 
nuclear. At this stage, given the country's ambitions for long-term economic growth, the energy 
intensity of its economy, and the long-term, relatively cheap, stable energy supplied by nuclear, it 






4.4.2 IRP 2010 charts a course towards a lower carbon energy mix 
Nuclear was included in a twenty-year energy outlook and investment plan. The NIRP was 
replaced in 2010 by the DoE-led Integrated Energy Plan (IEP) and Integrated Resource Plan 
(IRP), which together, set the comprehensive energy agenda for the country. It is a multi-
stakeholder undertaking to develop the designed to so that the DoE can fulfil its mandate to ensure 
energy security for South Africa in line with the National Energy Act (34 of 2008) (Republic of 
South Africa, 2008) 14. Following Zuma’s voluntary international commitment to constrain carbon 
emissions, the IRP 2010-2030 allocated capacity to both renewables and nuclear, based on 
assumptions for energy demand, technological development and relative technology costs.  
 
The IRP process was meant to be regularly reviewed, in terms of the appropriateness of 
infrastructure, institutional arrangements in the energy sector, as well as the impact of global 
technological change (Republic of South Africa Department of Minerals and Energy, 1998). An 
update would not happen for another two years, but something more impactful than another policy 
document was introduced. 
4.4.3 Renewable Energy is Finally Introduced  
A highly skilled and effective programme office broke through the inertia to procure the first utility-
scale renewable energy. The now internationally lauded REIPPPPP was established in 2011. 
REIPPPP is a highly successful procurement initiative, which is run from an office in the DOE with 
extensive involvement from National Treasury's PPP Unit (Eberhard et al., 2014). It has worked by 
coordinating an open competitive bidding process in response to Section 34 Ministerial 
Determinations, which stipulated DoE as the procurer and Eskom as the buyer of energy. IPPs that 
wanted to bid had to secure 'energy off-take agreements' with Eskom in advance of submitting 
their bids for consideration. 
 
Small-scale renewable energy also got a boost in 2011. As covered in Chapter 3, NERSA, playing 
its legislated role, released the Standard Conditions to allow municipalities to connect SSEG under 
100kW (covered in Chapter 3) (Government Technical Advisory Centre, 2015). Eskom was also 
tasked to investigate opportunities, and in consultation with NERSA, Eskom launched its IDM 
programme, to pilot off-grid and grid-tied small-scale renewable energy solutions for industrial and 
agricultural electricity consumers (Redelinghuys, 2012). While the Standard Conditions were 
                                                 
 
 
14 Other pertinent legislation not covered here includes the Central Energy Fund Act, 1977 (Act No. 38 of 1977) and the 






problematic, they evidence NERSA's tentative support for these small-scale technologies, as well 
as the financial concerns of local governments. 
 
The centralised procurement of utility and some small-scale renewable energy pushed on. In 
March 2012, the first 79 bids were received by the REIPPPP office  (Eberhard et al., 2014). Four 
more successive bid rounds were conducted (including Round 3.5) between 2012 and 2016. The 
programme has provided increasingly cost efficient energy generation, reflective of global 
renewable energy technology improvement and cost efficiencies (Msimanga & Sebitosi, 2014). 
 
 
Figure 6: Year on year decreases in the cost of renewables. Data Source: GreenCape, 2015 
 
REIPPPP introduced some diversity of ownership of energy generation capacity, but it did not 
seriously challenge the structure of the sector. The power to determine the scale and power 
source, and control the procurement strategy and off-take agreements, was still limited to the 
Minister of Energy. These decisions were certainly far out of reach of local governments. IPPs can 
only sell their electricity directly to Eskom, which is required to develop a take-off agreement 
(purchasing contract) with each IPP even before they are allowed to bid for the right to generate 
electricity. Consequently, the success of the programme was hinged on Eskom's willingness and 
ability to enable connection to the national transmission grid. Because Eskom serves as 
intermediary and gatekeeper, the REIPPPP's cost savings over time have been internalised in its 
complex accounting system, covering its many different functions. 
 
Eskom's hold on REIPPPP began to show signs of shifting in 2013, however. NERSA awarded 
PowerX (then Amatola Green Power) an energy trader license, allowing it to buy electricity from 
IPPs and sell this on to consumers. Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality (NMBM) signed a 15-year 
























distribution grid to transport this electricity (ICLEI, 2015). The practice remained limited to just 
NMBM, with other metros uncertain of the regulatory implications. Still, an alternative to Eskom's 
procurement role was established. 
4.4.4 Decentralised renewables: a path of least regret 
In the same year, the policy context for decentralised energy got another boost when the updated 
IRP 2013 was released. After more than five years of municipal work on SSEG, and following the 
publication of the Standard Conditions, SSEG was now incorporated into official energy policy. The 
IRP 2013 sought to respond to an increasingly uncertain energy outlook, with significant decreases 
in projected energy demand, linked to increasing energy efficiency driven by price increases 15. It 
did so by emphasising the need for adaptive energy investments, so as not to lock the country into 
a path that it could not afford to correct in time. Consequently, the case that had been made for 
nuclear was waning. SSEG through rooftop solar PV was specifically proposed as a less risky 
alternative to a massive public investment in new nuclear generation, planned back in 2010. SSEG 
was proposed as providing a "path of least regret" in an uncertain context (Republic of South Africa 
Department of Energy, 2013).  
 
Also in 2013, the DoE initiated a New Generation Capacity IPP Procurement Programme for 
100MW of capacity from SSEG, limited to systems between 1MW and 5MW. The programme left 
smaller systems unregulated, and providing a space for bottom-up municipal policy and regulatory 
development, undertaken in partnership with NERSA (see Chapter 3) (Department of Energy, n.d.-
a).  
4.4.5 Plans go nuclear 
Official policies continued to promote renewables, and gradually to incorporate not only centrally 
procured and managed infrastructure but also municipally managed infrastructure.  At this point, 
nuclear energy made a re-entry. In 2013, representatives of the South African Cabinet were 
officially engaging Russia to establish an international nuclear procurement deal, in the same year 
that the IRP update advised against making a decision on whether or not the expand nuclear 
capacity (Thamm, 2016). Negotiations with the Russian government and possible service 
                                                 
 
 
15 The IRP forecasts national energy demand for 2030 within a range of 345,000-416,000 GWh. This range represents 
an 8.4% to 24% decrease from the 2010 forecast of 454,000 GWh for 2030, made just three years earlier. To meet 
demand, the updated IRP sets a target of 61,200MW (down from 67,800MW) of reliable peak generation capacity 






providers continued despite public opposition to nuclear, and with no engagement with this 
objection. 
 
By 2014, media reports were already alleging that rent-seeking and patronage were shaping the 
nuclear agenda. Harold Winkler of the Energy Research Centre at the University of Cape Town 
questioned: "Will it be based on the best available information or on the basis of geo-political 
relations with Russia, China and France?"  (Kings, 2014). Also in 2014, reports were released 
claiming Zuma had made a deal at a BRICS meeting in Brazil, issuing an instruction for Minister 
Tina Joemat-Pettersson to establish a 9,600MW procurement programme to engage with Russia, 
exclusively (Qaanitah Hunter & Lionel Faull, 2014). The procurement programme was confirmed in 
a joint statement by the DoE and Russia’s state-owned nuclear company, Rosatom. 
4.5 Process Tracing: Nuclear in Conflict with Renewables 2014-2016 
4.5.1 Municipal energy expands under the radar 
From 2014, municipal activities in localised energy began to accelerate. With NERSA's ad hoc 
approval at every stage, the first commercial solar installations commenced in Cape Town. 
NERSA's Standard Conditions no longer defined the scope of legitimate projects. Seven 
metropolitan municipalities and five local municipalities participated in workshops hosted by 
AMEU, SALGA, ESKOM and GIZ over the next two years to share knowledge and develop local 
regulatory frameworks and financial mechanisms. The SALGA national executive committee 
(NEC) approved a metering concept that was delivered to NERSA. The concept informed the 
development of the draft Small-Scale Regulations through to 2015. The Small-Scale Regulations 
would formalise the emergent role for local governments in energy planning and facilitation, as well 
as managing revenue impacts through fee and tariff structures. NERSA was not wrong to act in 
line with the IRP, but the team that was pushing for these regulations was wrong in assuming that 
all stakeholders were working for the same outcome. Despite a clear policy directive, NERSA's 
attempts at clarifying SSEG were side-lined. 
4.5.2 The War Room responds to Eskom’s shortcomings 
Oblivious to local government progress, and while nuclear continued to proceed covertly, what was 
happening in the public sphere was the establishment of the "War Room" by the Presidency in 
December 2014. Its purpose was to urgently address the energy security crisis and governance 
failures in Eskom in South Africa (Lucy Baker et al., 2015). The War Room is a government sub-
committee that falls under Cabinet's Inter-Ministerial Committee on Energy, chaired by Deputy 
President, Cyril Ramaphosa. The War Room is co-chaired by the Minister of Energy and Minister 






silos, ensuring collaboration between the Departments of Public Enterprises, Energy, National 
Treasury, Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, Economic Development, Mineral 
Resources and Trade and Industry. 
 
The War Room's focus has been rescuing Eskom from its internal mismanagement. It has been 
widely criticised for its lack of transparency, lack of regard for the IRP and blindness to global 
decentralised renewable technological innovation with its potentially broad economic benefit (Fakir, 
2015; Pollet, Staffell, & Adamson, 2015). The energy crisis was used to frame a narrative to 
legitimise the emergency ‘5-Point Energy Plan' premised on centralised control of the sector. 
Previously powerful stakeholders have reportedly been excluded from decision-making concerning 
this plan. Excluded stakeholders include the unions, civil society and key renewable energy actors 
from decision-making processes. 
 
During this time, Eskom also expanded into utility-scale renewable investments. The 100MW Sere 
wind farm and a 100MW concentrated solar power (CSP) plant were funded predominantly 
through World Bank and African Development Bank loans (Eberhard et al., 2014). The SOC has 
been granted 300MW Kleinzee Wind Farm in the Nama Khoi Local Municipality in the Northern 
Cape. Additional wind farms are being planned in the Western and Eastern Cape (Eskom Holdings 
SOC Ltd, 2016). 
4.5.3 NERSA’s regulations are scuppered 
As covered in the previous chapter, NERSA's May 2015 deadline for developing the Small-Scale 
Regulations was pushed out, until the regulations were finally indefinitely suspended on 16 
December 2015. The DoE's role in this suspension was revealed when it was announced that all 
licencing conditions for energy generation were under review. The DoE's actions have limited 
NERSA's role to the ad hoc approvals and advisory support for municipalities, which were left to 
develop regulations, from the bottom up. 
 
REIPPPP’s success continued to be supported, however. The Minister went on to issue a Section 
34 Determination for a further 6,300MW of renewable energy capacity on 18 August 2015 
(Govender, 2015). 
4.5.4 Friction mounts over nuclear in the National Executive Council (NEC) 
It has emerged that within the NEC itself there was not agreement on the nuclear programme. In 






of Finance, Nhlanhla Nene, was fired on 9 December 2015, just hours after Cabinet approved the 
nuclear procurement programme that Nene had suggested was unaffordable (Gosam, 2017).  
 
In direct contradiction with the IRP 2013, and with no updated alternative plan in place, on 21 
December 2015, a ministerial determination called for 9600MW of additional nuclear capacity in 
line with the IRP 2010-2030 (Republic of South Africa Department of Minerals and Energy, 2015).  
Following this, the new Minister of Finance, Pravin Gordhan16, announced in the budget speech 
2016, that the success of REIPPPP would be replicated in a procurement programme for nuclear 
energy17with funds already set aside to enable this procurement (Republic of South Africa National 
Treasury, 2016). The new Minister continued to question the project's affordability, however, and 
committed to supporting or opposing the deal on these grounds alone. 
 
Several credible research agencies, together with the DoE's own previously communicated 
analysis and policies, suggest nuclear capacity is unnecessary. The question of affordability also 
continues to be contested, with the Ministry and Eskom arguing in favour, and opposition political 
parties, academics and civil society arguing against (Eberhard, 2016; Ensor, 2016; Yelland, 
2016a). The CSIR, a publically funded research body, released a report comparing the relative 
cost of new energy generation for wind, solar, coal and nuclear. The cost of a new nuclear build is 
expected to even out to R1,30/kWh, more expensive than new solar, wind and coal (CSIR, 2016; 
Yelland, 2016a). For renewables, this assessment takes required natural gas peaking power 
requirements to compensate for intermittency into account.  
 
While the uptake of small-scale PV was quietly ignored by national government, media reports 
from 31 March and 4 April 2016 disclosed proof of covert Cabinet-level negotiations to buy a fleet 
of six Russian nuclear reactors. This deal allegedly falls outside of conventional procurement 
processes and in possible contravention of Constitutional due process (Paton, 2016; Thamm, 
2016). Further evidencing the insularity of decision-making for the energy sector, it was revealed in 
March 2016, that Minister Joemat-Pettersson deliberately ignored legal advice that the nuclear 
deal in question required tabling under Section 231.2 of the Constitution, which prescribed public 
participation and parliamentary approval because of its long-term fiscal implications (Thamm, 
                                                 
 
 
16 David van Rooyen, a public servant with a reputation for bad performance was briefly installed by Zuma, but this was 
widely opposed (Gosam, 2017). 
17 Processes are also underway to procure independent power from other sources, including coal, cogeneration and 







2016). The nuclear procurement deal was challenged by two civil society organisations, EarthLife 
Africa and Southern African Faith Communities Environment Institute, in the Western Cape High 
Court. The respondents include the Minister of Energy, the President, NERSA, and representatives 
from Parliament. 
4.5.5 Eskom undermines REIPPPP 
While a nuclear deal was being designed out of sight, both REIPPPP and localised renewable 
energy were allowed to continue. This apparent support or at least tolerance for the programme 
shifted when Eskom caused major controversy in 2016. Brian Molefe's (then Chief Executive), 
correspondence was leaked, communicating the SOC's refusal to connect more (already planned 
and approved) renewable IPPs to the transmission grid (Creamer, 2016). Since this revelation in 
July 2016, Eskom's pro-nuclear stance has been vehemently reinforced, with the utility being one 
of the Minister's few vocal supporters of nuclear expansion. By October 2016, not the DoE, nor the 
Minister, nor Eskom had provided any concrete information to explain why South Africa needs 
nuclear energy. 
 
In December, it was announced that Eskom would be the official procurement agent for nuclear 
power, which it would own, operate, and finance through further significant international borrowing. 
This was despite its already dire financial situation18 (Eskom Media Desk, 2016). What this meant 
was that the original determination, which was the subject of the High Court challenge, had 
changed. The Minister had delivered this new evidence minutes before the case was set to 
commence. The High Court ordered that the Minister pay punitive costs and the case was 
postponed to February 2017 (Groundup, 2016). 
4.5.6 A story of state capture 
As the set of relationships around the nuclear deal have become clearer, so its promotion of 
private interests that deviate from public objectives have too (Rennkamp & Bhuyan, 2016). The 
nuclear procurement programme, conservatively estimated to cost USD50 billion, with the unlikely 
caveat that the build runs on schedule and nothing goes wrong, has been linked back to issues of 
state capture along two channels.  The Public Protector's recent report on state capture, titled 
"State of Capture" connects Eskom's pro-nuclear ex-CEO Molefe with President Zuma and a 
                                                 
 
 
18 In addition to its debt of approximately $300 billion, in 2015, a funding gap of R225 billion for planned work over the 
following five years, was identified (OECD, 2015a). In the same year, Standard & Poor's downgraded Eskom's credit 







network of actors, allegedly using public funds to pursue private benefit. These actors are linked to 
coal mining interests belonging to the Gupta family, now synonymous with the phrase ‘state 
capture' in South Africa (Public Protector of South Africa, 2016). Since Molefe’s resignation, further 
allegations of links between the nuclear deal, and networks of patronage emerging around Zuma, 
and connected to the Gupta family again (through uranium interests) have been reported in the 
media (Gosam, 2017).  
4.5.7 Erasing the map, redefining the territory: IRP 2016 
The gradual lack of support for renewable energy underpins an attempt to create some vaguely 
credible energy demand and affordability case for nuclear procurement. The IRP that sanctioned 
renewable energy generation at all scales has finally been updated. Following Cabinet's approval 
on 2 November 2016, the "Integrated Resource Plan Update" (hereafter Draft IRP 2016) and 
updated IEP were both released for public comment (Joemat-Petersson, 2016; Republic of South 
Africa Department of Energy, 2016). The Draft IRP 2016 rolls back its support for SSEG, places 
technology constraints on possible energy generated from renewable sources, and applies highly 
contested technology costs in its assessment (Republic of South Africa Department of and Energy, 
2016; Yelland, 2016b). The cost of nuclear energy, in particular, is derived using a wildly out of 
date Rand to Dollar exchange rate of $1,00 = R11,55 (EPRI, 2015).  
 
Initially, the Draft IRP 2016 included references to several appended schedules providing detail on 
the assumptions and data for the assessment of an energy "base case" from which several 
possible scenarios and policy recommendations are to be developed. These schedules were never 
provided. Instead, upon discovery of this oversight, a revised document with all references to 
detailed information removed, was published. A series of opportunities for input has commenced, 
which, according to this document, will culminate in the new official energy outlook and policy 
being released in March 2017. 
4.6 Concluding comments 
While nuclear procurement and renewables were part of the same coherent energy policy for 
South Africa in 2010, the country's economic growth, energy pricing, and technology options 
shifted so much between then and 2016, that this is no longer the case. This was already apparent 
in 2013. The economic case for renewable energy in South Africa has been growing stronger, in 
part because of the success of REIPPPP, which introduced successful, centrally managed 
renewable energy through an internationally lauded procurement programme. This programme has 
not seriously challenged the structure of the energy sector, however. While it has introduced some 






with the Ministry. It is clear that the Minister's and Eskom's support for nuclear are part of a covert 
procurement process that goes back to 2013, with links to ‘state capture' networks. While rent-
seeking is certainly possible with any energy procurement, whether renewable or nuclear, this 
deal's scale of economic impact on South Africa's economy is cause for urgent action. 
 
REIPPPP presents an alternative to nuclear, but because it is centrally managed, it remains 
vulnerable to a direct conflict with nuclear, as demonstrated by Eskom's announcements of 2016. 
As municipalities grow their legitimacy in the energy sector, expanding their mandate and power, 
REIPPPP can build its resilience by diversifying energy procurement points. The City of Cape 
Town (CCT) Mayor Patricia de Lille announced in January 2017 that the City was prepared to take 
the Minister to court over the right to purchase energy directly from IPPs, without having to go 
through Eskom (Evans, 2016). The announcement was made at the opening of a new waste to 
energy plant. Direct procurement from IPPs is one step further than NMBM working through 
PowerX, and it presents a new strategy to drive renewables, illustrated below. 
 
 
Figure 7: Contested pathways for South Africa's Energy Future 
While individual municipal challenges to the Minister’s control presents an opportunity to break 
through the pro-nuclear logjam at a national level, it still does not solve the issue of sustainable, 
affordable and equitable management of decentralised renewables, raised in the previous two 
chapters. The challenges for decentralisation require focused attention, as well as adequate policy 






5 Conclusion: The Contest for a Secure, Low-Carbon, Energy 
Future 
When the research for this paper commenced in January 2016, two critical events had just 
occurred. The first was that NERSA's much-awaited regulations, Small-Scale Embedded Energy 
Regulatory Rules for energy systems up to 1MVA, providing a potential coherent national 
regulatory framework for the local management of decentralised renewable energy, were 
suspended. The suspension was put in place, pending the release of new generation licensing 
conditions by the DoE (NERSA, 2015a).   By February 2017, the DoE's licensing framework has 
still not materialised. The second event was the announcement of a ministerial determination for 
9,600 MW of new nuclear energy generation, officially starting an infrastructure procurement 
process (Republic of South Africa Department of Minerals and Energy, 2015).   
 
While this research was undertaken, over the course of 2016, the relationship between these 
events became clearer. Both were signals, gesturing to the respective directions in which the 
South African energy sector was being driven. The nuclear procurement programme that is still 
unfolding is a commitment to a centralised configuration of infrastructure ownership and energy 
planning, procurement and management. At the same time, however, municipal governments are 
responding to global and local trends, new technology and existing policy, to develop energy 
planning, policies, investments and regulations that would lead the sector towards greater 
decentralisation. Understood together, the two framing events suggest that the evolution of South 
Africa's energy sector has reached a critical point, a kind of aporia from which it is not clear which 
way it will go. It was this aporia that gave rise to the hypothesis: 
 
H1: Municipal policy, regulations, investments and facilitation are creating a bottom-up alternative 
to South Africa's highly centralised energy sector, in which energy planning, procurement, 
generation, transmission, and a proportion of the distribution, are all determined through 
centralised institutional configurations. 
 
After contextualising South African municipalities' efforts within a broader global context of 
decentralisation of energy sectors through the uptake of renewable energy technologies in Chapter 
2, this hypothesis was tested by applying a process tracing methodology to municipal activities and 
related outcomes between 2008 and 2016 in Chapter 3. Attention was directed at two case 
studies, the City of Cape Town (CCT) and Drakenstein Municipality, respectively, in the Western 






municipalities, slowly carved out technical, financial and policy responses to enable direct 
investment in, and facilitation of, localised renewable energy generation and management. Despite 
a national regulatory grey area, an initial cohort of municipalities, two in 2008, growing to 13 by 
2012, have worked independently and in partnership, to redefine their role in the energy sector, 
from the bottom up. 
 
On its own, Chapter 3 affirms the hypothesis, H1, as correct. Cumulatively, over eight years and 
across a growing number of local governments, municipal governments have implemented a small 
but significant amount of legal decentralised renewable energy generation and consumption. 
NERSA's ad hoc input, approvals and licensing have been critical to the success of these efforts, 
leading to an expanding legally mandated role for municipal governments in the energy sector by 
2016. 
 
Returning to the original two events that sparked this inquiry, it was necessary to probe more 
carefully, to question to the viability of this bottom-up disruption of the increasingly insular national, 
determination of the country's energy sector. For this purpose, a second hypothesis was 
formulated, as a supplement to the first: 
 
H2: The development of a top-down nuclear procurement programme is crowding out any space 
for the development of decentralised renewable energy. 
 
To test this hypothesis, it was useful to juxtapose nuclear with not only small-scale renewable 
energy but also with REIPPPP, as examples of distinct but not mutually exclusive strategies to 
secure an increasing share of renewables as the primary driver of decarbonisation of the energy 
sector. Many municipalities in the Western Cape, as well as Nelson Mandela Bay and others, have 
been vocal in their enthusiasm for REIPPPP. By tracing the top-down (national) and bottom-up 
(municipal) processes leading up to and surrounding the establishment of a nuclear procurement 
programme, it became clear that stakeholders driving this deal were increasingly positioned in 
tension with REIPPPP. The tension was most blatantly demonstrated by Eskom's leadership in 
2016. While ardently promoting nuclear as a long-term affordable investment (without evidence), 
Eskom's Chairperson and ex-CEO both questioned and actively delayed REIPPPP's processes 
(Creamer, 2016). In 2010, Nuclear and renewable energy had made sense as part of the same 
national strategy to achieve decarbonisation and energy security. In 2016, however, as pointed out 
by critics of the nuclear deal, pro-nuclear actors, and the IRP 2013 and Draft IRP 2016, this was no 






Yelland, 2016a, 2016b). The advancement of a nuclear procurement programme was indeed set to 
undermine further implementation of REIPPPP, and bottom-up municipally driven renewable 
energy proliferation.  
 
The story does not end there, however, because nuclear procurement is by no means, a done 
deal. Municipalities' plans for localised renewable energy are not limited to only small-scale 
commercial, residential or municipal embedded energy. Already, a growing area of energy 
procurement and facilitation is bringing the REIPPPP programme and its small and utility scale 
projects closer to the municipal push for expanding local agency in energy matters. Chapter 3 
outlines those relationships that are both possible and being pursued, most notably, the NERSA-
approved licencing of PowerX as an energy trader, allowed to operate by Nelson Mandela Bay, 
within its boundaries. This kind of relationship means that REIPPPP is less vulnerable to any 
challenges from Eskom because IPPs can engage directly with consumers that demand its 
greener, cheaper electricity. It also means that municipalities have a wider range of options at 
larger scales to shape local energy security, without having to establish complex procurement 
deals and vet suppliers themselves. 
 
The potential for REIPPPP and municipalisation to work together as a coherent strategy to ensure 
the continuation of renewable energy investment as the main lever for energy security and 
decarbonisation was given another boost early in 2017. Although it falls outside of the scope of the 
initial period of investigation (2008-2016), it is extremely relevant. This fortification came in the 
form of an announcement by the Mayor of the City of Cape Town, stating that the City would be 
challenging the Ministry of Energy in court, over the right to procure energy directly from REIPPPP 
IPPs, circumventing Eskom as well as PowerX (Evans, 2016).   
 
The scope of municipal efforts documented in Chapter 3 affirms that, while nuclear is a 
countervailing force to the proliferation of renewable energy driven from national and municipal 
levels, it is not entirely crowding out these investments and opportunities. Even within the broader 
context of contestation explored in Chapter 4, the first hypothesis seems to hold. The current 
configuration remains precarious, still unsanctioned by national level NERSA regulations. The 
process of public participation to finalise the Draft IRP 2016 may work to undermine renewables in 
favour of nuclear. However, it could also quite feasibly open the nuclear process to yet more 
opposition, rendering it unable to maintain its thin veneer of pro-economic development discourse. 
 
It is clear that traditional national institutions (the Ministry, DoE, Cabinet, Eskom), as well as 






and conflicting ways. If the country implements these strategies concurrently, it risks (as pointed 
out in the 2013 IRP Update) the burden of an unaffordable, overcapitalised, inefficient 
infrastructure network (Republic of South Africa Department of Energy, 2013). As pointed out in 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, an optimal implementation of any degree of decentralised energy 
requires a coordinated response with adequate bottom-up and top-down policy and investment to 
mitigate the risks associated with this process. If municipalities proceed without coordination and 
appropriate national-level engagement with the risks and trade-offs that will emerge, the system as 
a whole will suffer. The most vulnerable households, neighbourhoods, towns and cities will suffer 
first and most. The pursuit of nuclear energy comes with its particular risks, as noted in the DoE's 
planning. It also presents governance and corruption risks that continue to surface as the "State of 
Capture" report is reinforced with a growing body of evidence of widespread corruption implicating 
Eskom and others. Credible research published by the CSIR and others, as covered in Chapters 2, 
3 and 4, suggests that this a coherent, national decarbonisation and energy security strategy, 
premised on a transition to a mix of renewable energy investments, both centrally and municipally 
managed, could feasibly be pursued. As things stand, however, it is not possible to predict either 
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